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general social development. In this report the degree of climate 
policy integration in different European countries, policy sectors and, 
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measures and means to enhance climate policy integration and 
improve policy coherence are analysed. 
This report shows that the inclusion of climate change mitigation 
and adaptation in general governmental programmes and strategies 
has substantially increased in recent years. Much more will be 
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specifi c measures. Annual budgets, impact assessments and spatial 
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Foreword
Scientifi c evidence of a causal relationship between human activity and climate change 
provides a major challenge to policy-making. Mitigation of climate change impacts and 
adaptation to them will affect our environment and our societies in many ways. For 
researchers, the sheer scale and complexity of the interactions between society and 
the environment are daunting, both from scientifi c and organisational view points. Major 
progress in understanding the complex interplay of the processes of global change, 
mitigation and adaptation measures, and their impacts, can only be made through well-
coordinated joint research across national and disciplinary borders. 
In November 2007, the Directors of seven of Europe’s large environmental research 
organisations, united in the Partnership for European Environmental Research (PEER), 
expressed their commitment to this twofold challenge. They decided to implement two joint 
research projects: 1) A comparison of national adaptation strategies (Swart et al. 2009), 
and 2) Climate change policy integration, coherence and governance (this report). The 
rationale for this choice was the fact that, over recent decades, climate change research 
has focused primarily on the climate system, impacts in general terms, and on mitigation. 
The recent emergence of climate change adaptation policies in Europe, however, poses 
new challenges. It must also be recognized that the environmental, economic and social 
impacts of adaptation and mitigation policies will be affected by many other policies, 
which makes climate policy integration and coherence essential. 
The PEER centres are heavily involved in national and regional research initiatives 
and in multidisciplinary environmental research programmes funded by the European 
Commission. This is an excellent position from which to compare the climate policies and 
coherence challenges of different European countries, using common concepts, methods 
and data. With this approach, important differences as well as similarities have been 
identifi ed. Evidence-based conclusions and recommendations to policy makers at EU and 
Member State level are presented so that the implications for future policy development 
in the EU can be assessed. 
This volume reports on the results of the project: Climate change policy integration, 
coherence and governance. Based on the conclusions of this study, major tasks are 
apparent for both policy makers and researchers. Policy makers need to place greater 
emphasis on climate-related issues than is currently the case in the planning and execution 
of general and sector specifi c policies. Annual budgets, impact assessments and spatial 
planning are examples of existing measures that should integrate climate concerns 
to a greater extent than they currently do. Addressing climate change and integrating 
climate concerns into other policies requires a better understanding of the economic 
and social processes involved in mitigation, as well as in adaptation. This requires more 
research specifi cally focused on these processes and the role of policies within them. 
In addition, there is a huge need for increased policy and programme evaluation from a 
climate change perspective. This should provide new insights into how best to implement 
measures and develop them further.  
As PEER chair, it is my great pleasure to introduce our climate change project 
outputs to policy makers and to our stakeholders in the international scientifi c community. 
I acknowledge and thank the many colleagues from various disciplines who contributed to 
the work, either as members of the two project teams, or by providing the multidisciplinary 
data in the PEER knowledge bank to support the studies. The lessons learnt in this joint 
programming of our research activities will be of great value for the future of PEER.
As PEER, we are committed to strengthening our integrated research and providing 
sound and policy-relevant information to Europe’s decision makers. We look forward to 
contributing to the further development of the European Research Area by sharing and 
exchanging our expertise and skills with other relevant research institutions. Working 
together, we can ensure that future decisions will be based on the best information 
available, minimizing risks and, in some cases, turning threats into opportunities. 
                         Wallingford, U.K., January 21, 2009
Prof. dr. Pat Nuttall
PEER chair
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Summary
Climate policy integration matters 
– Challenges and aims of the study
It is becoming evident that if high-consumption societies are to tackle climate 
change, signifi cant changes in production processes as well as in consumption 
patterns will be required. Such transformations cannot be achieved unless 
climate change is taken into account in the general and sector-specifi c policies 
which underlie economic activity and general social development. When industry, 
energy producers or transport companies take action as a result of climate 
policies, they are also infl uenced signifi cantly by other policies. The degree to 
which climate change issues are considered and integrated into existing policy 
areas is therefore a key issue, along with climate-specifi c measures such as 
emissions trading. This report assesses the extent of climate policy integration 
in different European countries, policy sectors and in some cases regions and 
municipalities. The assessment is based on fi ve criteria: inclusion, consistency, 
weighting, reporting and resources. The report also analyses measures and 
means for enhancing climate policy integration and improving policy coherence.
Methods and added value
This study is based on several case studies at different levels of governance. The 
separately published country studies focus on Denmark, Finland, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. In each country, several policies 
are examined, focusing on one or two policies in particular. In addition, some 
regions and municipalities are examined in detail. The study is based on the view 
that analysing and comparing experiences over time and across sectors and 
countries is benefi cial and instructive. However, oversimplifi ed, straightforward 
comparisons can be seriously misleading. It is essential, therefore, that case-
specifi c characteristics are fully taken into account. By undertaking broad 
comparative studies with in-depth involvement by researchers with national 
knowledge and different disciplinary backgrounds, it is possible to maintain a 
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country- and context-specifi c understanding. At the same time, all of the new 
perspectives that emerge as a result of comparison using common concepts and 
questions can be introduced. This is the obvious added value of a network such 
as PEER undertaking studies such as this one.
Increased political importance and inclusion 
This study shows that climate change is currently one of the most important political 
issues in Europe and that political support for climate issues is clearly broader 
than it used to be. Climate change has a more prominent role in governmental 
programmes than ever before, and it is no longer delegated to just one minister, 
one ministry or a few institutions. It has become a matter for prime ministers, 
whole cabinets and entire administrations. The most recent national climate 
strategies recognise the need for, and are built on, climate policy integration to a 
much greater extent than was previously the case. At the local level, many large 
cities, as well as smaller municipalities, have made climate commitments which 
are often more ambitious than commitments made at a national level.
Local experiences of extreme weather events combined with concrete 
local mitigation efforts have made it obvious that climate change mitigation 
and adaptation are matters for multi-level governance. There is a clear political 
opportunity to address climate change more broadly than ever before. In order to 
make the most of this opportunity, however, it is absolutely essential to couple 
climate change concerns and related solutions with other concerns, such as 
energy security, and with the responses to the economic recession that began 
following the fi nancial crises of autumn 2008.
More specifi c policy instruments are required 
This report demonstrates that the inclusion of climate change mitigation and 
adaptation in general governmental programmes and strategies has substantially 
increased in recent years. Improving the effi ciency of climate policy integration 
does not therefore primarily require its further inclusion in high-level strategies. 
More than anything else, it requires that the question of consistency be more 
directly and openly addressed, that climate change is given more political weight, 
that systematic reporting is undertaken and that resources for integration – both 
in the form of know-how and money – are made  available.
Of even greater importance than incorporating climate policy integration 
more deeply into policy strategies is ensuring that it is extended more fully to 
specifi c policy instruments. This entails adopting new policy instruments, such 
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as the 2008 Climate Change Act in the United Kingdom, and transforming the 
way in which well-established instruments are shaped and implemented. For 
example, the need to incorporate climate policy integration into spatial planning 
and governmental budgeting is common across the countries included in the 
study. It is important, however, that it does not become simply a question of 
reforming planning and budgeting processes – these are just means – but that 
the climate factor actually brings about a real change in land use plans and that 
funds are allocated in such a way that mitigation and adaptation by companies 
and individuals can be achieved. 
Multi-level governance is a necessity 
for successful climate policy integration
Too frequently, both mitigation and adaptation are seen in the context of just one 
level of governance or, if several levels are concerned, they are viewed as simply 
a top-down control problem. This study has clearly shown that both mitigation and 
adaptation concerns all levels from the local to the global, and that the interactions 
between levels are complex and multidirectional. While adaptation to climate 
change at the local level is crucial, water management and agriculture are just 
two examples of policy areas which are essential for adaptation, and which need 
to be supported by appropriate national and European framework conditions, 
such as funding strategies and adequate legal frameworks. European mitigation 
strategies, on the other hand, must be implemented in sectoral measures at the 
national level supported by decisions taken at the local and regional level that 
directly or indirectly mitigate CO2 emissions - for example, from traffi c, energy 
production or energy use. 
Reframing climate change as an ”economic opportunity”
The study also demonstrates that climate change is no longer seen purely as a 
problem which entails costs and job losses. Increasingly, climate change is being 
reframed as an opportunity for innovation, new markets and enterprises. The idea 
being promoted is that so-called win-win opportunities can benefi t industry and 
the climate alike and result in both mitigation of (or adaptation to) climate change 
and increased competitiveness. Innovation opportunities are being highlighted in 
several countries, including Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom. It is frequently the case that the innovation-based climate policy 
approach is focused solely on technological innovations, largely ignoring social 
innovations. The current emphasis on win-win solutions and innovation creates 
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new opportunities, but it may also conceal some trade-offs and cause some new 
confl icts. This is because, even if confl icts and contradictions often give rise to 
innovation, not all confl icts can be resolved by technologies or innovation, and the 
process of innovation can sometimes be very slow. 
Reopening old controversies 
When climate policy is integrated into an increasing number of policy sectors 
such as energy and transport, many old controversies and confl icts are reopened 
and reframed. The extended use of hydropower, and the construction of bridges, 
roads and waterways have all recently been promoted by arguments related to 
climate change. One of the main confl icts that has been reframed through climate 
change is that of nuclear power. Several countries have started to consider new 
nuclear power plants as an option for producing CO2-neutral energy; in fact, 
climate change became a major argument when the Finnish parliament approved 
an application for a fi fth nuclear power plant in 2001. As a consequence of issue-
linkage, decision-making on climate policy also needs to manage and resolve 
technical and political trade-offs and the confl icts latent in public controversies 
on issues such as nuclear power and mobility. In these cases, the successful 
integration of climate change will depend largely on the ability to handle general 
confl icts over ideology and values. 
More emphasis on assessment 
and evaluation is required for learning
The social and economic activities that lead to greenhouse gas emissions or 
vulnerability to climate change are very complex. Although research can contribute 
to an increased understanding of these processes, climate policy will always need 
to be formulated in a context dominated by uncertainty and ignorance. Climate 
policy integration – at all levels, from the EU to the local – should therefore be 
refl exive and able to learn from past experience. This means that the processes 
by which climate concerns are integrated into sectoral policies should be 
based on careful pre-assessment. In order to develop the policies adopted and 
implemented, however, policies should also be retrospectively evaluated from a 
climate perspective to a greater extent than hitherto.
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1. Introduction
It is inevitable that any policy aimed at climate change mitigation or adaptation will 
interact with other policies. Interaction may take place during policy preparation 
or implementation, but happens in particular when decisions are made by target 
groups. When industry, energy producers or transport companies take action 
as a result of climate change policies, their actions are also infl uenced by other 
policies. The extent to which climate change issues are considered and integrated 
into existing policy fi elds is therefore a key issue to be tackled in the future. 
Furthermore, if European societies are to become low-carbon societies, and if 
their ability to adapt to a changing climate is to be enhanced, then the coherence 
between these policies and climate policy aims should be increased. If the low-
carbon vision is to be achieved, it requires a comprehensive climate policy. Within 
such a comprehensive policy, climate-specifi c policies, such as emissions trading, 
should be complemented by general or sector-specifi c policies which take climate 
policy aims into account. In other words, annual budgets, fi nancial policies, 
agricultural, traffi c and regional policies would all need to integrate climate policy 
aims to a greater extent than hitherto in order to give consumers and producers 
stronger and more coherent signals.
Climate policy integration1  and coherence should be viewed in the context 
of multi-level governance. Measures undertaken or suggested at the European 
Union (EU) level – such as the EU ”Climate action and renewable energy package” 
(2008) and the Green Paper on climate change adaptation (2007) – interact with 
those originating at the national, regional and local levels. The outcomes of policy 
integration materialize as concrete actions, taken partly in terms of management 
or regulation, but mainly in the form of the changed practices of target groups. 
These actions are normally implemented at the local level. 
1 Throughout this study we use the term ”climate policy integration” and ”climate policy” although 
the terms ”climate change policy integration” and ”climate change policy” would be more precise. 
The reason is that ”climate policy integration” and ”climate policy” are the terms that have become 
established in the literature and are also more communicative.
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This study will fi rst and foremost aim at an increased understanding of the 
features and conditions for better integrated and more coherent climate policies 
and governance processes. In addition, the endeavour is not only descriptive 
and analytical, but also practical – that is, designed to help improve policy 
performance.
The study’s aims are:
To assess the degree of climate policy integration in different countries and • 
policy sectors (energy, traffi c, spatial planning, education, etc. ), in some cases 
at the local level, and to determine key coherence problems between climate 
policies and other policies at different levels.
To suggest means – such as institutions, processes (e.g. EIA) or measures – to • 
enhance climate policy integration and improve policy coherence, within the 
context of multi-level governance.
The study is based on the view that analysing and comparing experiences 
across time, sectors and countries is benefi cial and instructive. Oversimplifi ed, 
straightforward comparisons may be seriously misleading, however; and 
case-specifi c characteristics should be borne in mind. By undertaking broad 
comparative studies with in-depth involvement by researchers with national 
knowledge and different disciplinary backgrounds, the country –  and context 
– specifi c understanding can be maintained at the same time as all the new 
perspectives that emerge as a result of comparison using common concepts and 
questions are introduced. Put bluntly, none of the research institutes involved 
could have undertaken the study in isolation – such a task requires a network. 
The study deals with both climate change mitigation and adaptation 
policies. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007, 878) defi nes 
mitigation thus: ”An anthropogenic intervention to reduce the anthropogenic 
forcing of the climate system; it includes strategies to reduce greenhouse gas 
sources and emissions and enhancing greenhouse gas sinks.” Mitigation 
policies thus refer to policies that are intended to enhance mitigation, i.e. to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions or to promote sinks. IPCC (2007, 869) defi nes 
adaptation as, ”Adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual 
or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits 
benefi cial opportunities. Various types of adaptation can be distinguished, 
including anticipatory, autonomous and planned adaptation.” Adaptation policies 
are therefore policies that intend to enhance adaptation.
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The report is structured in the following way:
In Section 2 we introduce the key concepts, discuss the multi-case study • 
approach and the materials used in the study.
Section 3 summarises the fi ndings on climate policy integration undertaken or • 
under way in the countries included in the study.
Building on the empirical experience and evidence of the country studies, • 
Section 4 analyses the potential of key measures and means for enhancing 
climate policy integration and improving the policy coherence.
Section 5 then discusses and summarises the central fi ndings of the study • 
and makes proposals for upgrading the climate policy integration and its 
coherence. 
The main conclusions of the study are presented in Section 6.• 
18 Climate Policy Integration, Coherence and Governance
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2. Key concepts, 
approaches, materials 
2.1. Key concepts
2.1.1. Policy integration
Based on the defi nition of policy integration made by Underdal (1980), and 
environmental policy integration by Lafferty and Hovden (2003), we defi ne climate 
policy integration as: 
the incorporation of the aims of climate change mitigation and adaptation into • 
all stages of policy-making in other policy sectors (non-environmental as well 
as environmental);
complemented by an attempt to aggregate expected consequences for climate • 
change mitigation and adaptation into an overall evaluation of policy, and a 
commitment to minimise contradictions between climate policies and other 
policies.
In order to evaluate the degree of climate policy integration, one has to focus 
the evaluation by asking where policy integration should be found. Assuming that 
there is a political commitment that a policy objective should be integrated into 
other policies, this needs to be refl ected in policy strategies – 
in general strategies such as government programmes, 
and in sector-specifi c ones – as well as in the policy 
instruments (e.g. laws, taxes, support schemes, infor-
mation material etc.) by which the strategies are 
implemented. Since policy integration is designed 
not just to change bureaucracies but to result in 
actual climate change mitigation and adaptation, 
it is essential to extend the examination to include 
policy outputs2 and outcomes3 (Figure 1). If climate 
change is integrated into educational policies, it 
should be incorporated into the materials used in 
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schools, into lessons and ultimately into the knowledge and the daily habits of 
pupils. If policy integration proves to be a good way in which to promote climate 
change mitigation and adaptation, the more knowledgeable pupils will behave 
differently as adults. Furthermore, strategies and policy instruments may be 
formed at any governmental level, from the global to the local. The conceptual 
model in Figure 1 is thus not bound to any particular governmental level.
Policy integration can be divided into horizontal policy integration and 
vertical policy integration within and across governmental levels4 (Figure 2). 
Horizontal policy integration refers to cross-sectoral measures and procedures 
by the government, or a governmental body, e.g. a commission, undertaken 
2 Policy outputs refer to ”what the administration produces and the target groups are faced with, e.g. 
a seminar, an environmental permit with detailed conditions or a subsidy paid. It is often easier to 
distinguish outputs from the internal administrative results if one approaches outputs from the side of 
the target groups.” (Mickwitz 2006)
3 Policy outcomes refer to the actions taken by the target groups in response to the outputs (Outcome 
1) and the consequences of these immediate outcomes (Outcome 2 … n). Very rarely is an outcome a 
result of policy outputs alone; rather it is affected by a variety of other factors as well.
Figure 1. The policy levels at which climate policy integration may take place
(Mickwitz et al. 2008a) Arrows in Figure 1 indicate infl uence but not unconditional causality, since 
many other factors usually affect development.
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in order to mainstream or bring about a comprehensive integration of climate 
change mitigation and adaptation aims into public policies. Typical means include 
broad climate change strategies and the integration of climate policies into 
the preparation and adoption of new regulations and the annual state budget. 
Vertical policy integration within governmental levels refers to the integration of 
climate policies into a specifi c sector. It includes sector-specifi c strategies and 
decisions made at ministerial level, as well as the integration of climate policy 
Figure 2. Horizontal and vertical climate policy integration 
 (Mickwitz et al. 2008a) Vertical policy integration may occur within, as well as between, levels (i.e. 
national state, state, region, local). 
4 In this report, the term ”level” is used in two different ways: governmental levels according to 
multi-level governance (local, regional, state, national state, supranational and global) and policy 
levels as in Figure 1, i.e. policy strategies, policy instruments and policy outcomes. In most cases the 
context makes it clear as to which type of level is being referenced; in cases where this is not obvious, 
governmental level is used when ”level” refers to multi-level governance levels and policy level when 
”level” refers to the levels in Figure 1.
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into the strategies, measures and actions taken by different agencies under the 
supervision of a ministry. Vertical policy integration can be assessed at just one 
level, but it also refers to integration throughout many levels (i.e. national state, 
state, region, local). Thus, vertical policy integration across levels refers to the 
integration of climate policies over different levels of policy making according to 
multi-level governance approaches (Bache and Flinders 2004).
Some criteria are required in order to be able to assess the degree of policy 
integration (Table 1). Numerous researchers (e.g. Lenschow 2002, Jordan and 
Lenschow 2008) have studied environmental policy integration and developed 
methods to assess its extent. Organisations such as the OECD (2002) and the 
European Environmental Agency (2005a,b) have also developed criteria and 
checklists for assessing environmental policy integration. The criteria used in this 
study are developed on the basis of the defi nition provided above (more details are 
available in Kivimaa and Mickwitz 2006 & Mickwitz and Kivimaa 2007). The fi rst 
criterion is ”the inclusion of climate change aims”. Some degree of “inclusion” is 
a prerequisite for the other criteria utilised. In order to recognise fully why climate 
policy integration cannot exist without any inclusion, the difference between 
policy integration and a policy with positive unintended side-effects from a 
climate point of view has to be taken into account. If a land use policy is reformed 
because of extreme weather, or an energy policy is renewed so as to decrease 
dependency on imported fossil fuel, but the fi rst does not consider adaptation 
to climate change and the second does not address mitigation, this does not 
represent policy integration; rather, it signifi es policies with synergies for climate 
policy aims. While inclusion in policy is necessary, it does not mean that inclusion 
in documents and statements is necessary. But documents and statements are 
written to refl ect what is considered important and can thus be used as sources 
when examining inclusion or other criteria.
When integrating a policy, it is essential that different policy aims and 
instruments are consistent with each other; or, as expressed by Lafferty and 
Hovden (2003), there should be ”a commitment to minimise contradictions”. A 
common means of achieving compromises is simply to include many different 
aims in one policy. If this is done without any attempt to create a consistent whole, 
one cannot truly talk about policy integration. The second evaluation criterion is 
thus, ”the consistency of the integrated climate change aspect in relation to other 
aspects”. 
Some have argued that, when there are confl icts between different policy 
aims, environmental issues should be prioritised (the second part of the Lafferty 
and Hovden defi nition). This argument is based on the view that environmental 
concerns cannot be balanced with other objectives because they relate to 
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preserving the carrying capacity of nature, i.e. the basis for any survival (Lafferty 
and Hovden 2003, 10). Climate change has been assessed as a serious threat to 
society. At the same time, it is clear that there will always be some emissions of 
greenhouse gases. There are many other pressing societal aims as well, however; 
and some of these are in confl ict with the aims of mitigating and adapting to 
climate change. Some confl icts can be resolved by creating win-win options, 
while in other cases political choices have to be made. In these cases, the weight 
given to climate aims is essential for the ability of climate policy integration to 
promote mitigation and adaptation. The third criterion will thus be ”weighting of 
the integrated climate change aspect with respect to other aspects”. 
The fourth criterion, ”reporting”, is based on the recognised importance 
of feedback for policy implementation. Reporting addresses the degree to which 
strategies include specifi cations ex ante about how climate change aims are to be 
followed up and reported. The reporting also takes into account the information on 
climate change mitigation and adaptation actually included in ex post evaluations 
of the policy instruments by which they were implemented. 
Finally, policy integration is not just about intentions; it also requires 
knowledge and resources – in the form of personnel, money or time. Recognizing 
strategy links or the impacts of an instrument on climate change mitigation and 
adaptation is not an easy task. Policy integration at all levels is thus dependent 
on the know-how of the people involved, the time they are able to spend on these 
questions and the resources that they have at their disposal. The fi fth criterion is 
thus, ”the resources for integrating climate change aspects”.
Table 1. Summary of the criteria that will be used to assess policy integration 
(Based on Kivimaa and Mickwitz 2006).
Criterion Key question
Inclusion To what extent are direct as well as indirect climate change mitigation and 
adaptation impacts covered?
Consistency Have the contradictions between the aims related to climate change mitigation 
and adaptation and other policy goals been assessed and have there been 
efforts to minimise revealed contradictions?
Weighting Have the relative priorities of climate change mitigation and adaptation impacts 
compared to other policy aims been decided and are there procedures for 
determining the relative priorities?
Reporting Are there clearly stated evaluation and reporting requirements for climate 
change mitigation and adaptation impacts (including deadlines) ex ante and 
have such evaluations and reporting happened ex post? Have indicators been 
defi ned, followed up and used? 
Resources Is internal as well as external know-how about climate change mitigation and 
adaptation impacts available and used and are resources provided?
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2.1.2. Policy coherence
Policy coherence is often taken to imply 
that various policies ”go together” be-
cause they share a set of ideas or 
aims. As pointed out by May et 
al. (2006) policy coherence is 
a relative term, and it cannot 
be measured directly. Policy 
coherence can be studied 
in respect of a policy sector 
(e.g. energy, transport, etc.), 
a target group (industries, 
energy producers, etc.) or 
a geographic area. Whereas 
some view policy co-ordination, 
consistency and coherence as 
synonyms, Jones (2002) argues that 
coherence goes further than the two 
other concepts in ”systematic promotion 
of mutually reinforcing policy actions across 
government departments and agencies creating synergies toward achieving the 
defi ned objective.” Whinship (2006) has stressed that policy coherence is not 
primarily about choosing between confl icting aims, but rather about enabling a 
process by which both aims and means can be redefi ned so that new win-win 
situations can be determined.
In this study, we shall refer mainly to the term ”policy coherence”. Policy 
coherence is used to imply that the incentives and signals of different policies – 
climate and others – provide target groups with non-confl icting signals. Policy co-
ordination is one of the means of achieving coherence. An aim of policy integration 
is also to achieve coherence, i.e. to introduce processes and means that reduce 
coherence problems between sectoral and climate policies. One would thus 
expect there to be fewer coherence problems in cases of extensive climate policy 
integration, especially based on the consistency criterion. However, even though 
climate aims have been widely included and consistency addressed, there may 
be fundamental confl icts between climate aims and other policy goals – and 
thus coherence problems may remain unless climate aims are given overriding 
priority. 
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2.1.3. Multi-level governance
For the purpose of policy integration, the perspective of multi-level governance 
is especially important. Bache and Flinders (2004) state: ”The multi-level 
governance concept thus contained both vertical and horizontal dimensions. 
‘Multi-level’ referred to the increasing interdependence of governments operating 
at different levels, while ‘governance’ signalled the growing interdependence 
between governments and non-governmental actors at various territorial levels.” 
Policy interdependency as such is nothing new but well recognized from 
federal systems in various countries. It presents additional challenges for policy 
integration, because interdependencies frequently lead to unclear competencies 
or responsibilities for government agencies at different levels, often in respect of 
the problem of budgeting. Reforming such policy interdependency and improving 
policy integration is by no means a trivial matter. At the same time, multi-level 
governance offers the opportunity to mandate policy response to the most 
appropriate level, as expressed by the subsidiarity principle. The subsidiarity 
principle states on the one hand that the EU should act where the objectives to 
be pursued can be better attained at the Community level, but stipulates on the 
other hand that it should not act if objectives can be satisfactorily attained by the 
Member States acting on their own (Newman 2001). The principle is frequently 
extended to the regional and local levels as well, in support of the argument that 
action should be taken as close to the citizens as possible.
For climate policies to be effective, both aspects are of key importance. 
If one follows the principle of subsidiarity, action should be taken at the lowest 
appropriate level, which includes the local or regional level. One the other 
hand, given the issue at stake, action should also be taken at the national or 
European level. This allows concrete action on climate change adaptation at 
the regional level, for national legislation on greenhouse gas reduction, as well 
as for European leadership on binding reduction targets and funding. On the 
other hand, the European multi-level system needs additional policy integration 
because of the existence of complex decision-making structures and specifi c 
failures of governance (e.g. unclear or overlapping responsibilities), as addressed 
under the concept of meta-governance (Jessop 2004). Moreover, horizontal 
and vertical aspects of policy integration are strongly interconnected and multi-
player processes are entangled with multi-level problems in complex, multi-level 
games, representing new forms of the internationalisation of the state (Brand et 
al. 2008).
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2.2. A multi-case study approach based 
on a variety of materials
The research tasks of this study (Section 1) required two types of approach: a 
comparative approach and more detailed case-specifi c approach. The comparative 
approach is based on assessing different cases in terms of policy integration 
and coherence by using reasonably similar methods, concepts and data so as 
to allow for a comparison of the results. This has been done at different levels 
(country-region-local) and focused on one or two sectors in particular. The main 
materials were documents, interviews and in some cases focus group discussions 
(as elaborated upon in the country studies). A key principle of the study was 
triangulation; that is, the combination of several perspectives to gain an increased 
understanding. Four types of triangulation can be identifi ed: multiple methods, 
multiple data sources within one method, multiple analysts, and multiple theories 
(e.g. Scriven 1991, 364). All four types of triangulation were used in this study. 
In addition to this main, comparative approach, specifi c approaches were used 
in some of the case studies. These are described in detail in the country studies; 
but, for example, the Spanish study used an actor-based assessment combined 
with a policy experiment, developed through participatory workshops. 
This study is based on a case study approach. Case studies are typically 
studies of a case of something, i.e., they are not studies of a unique object. At the 
same time, generalisations cannot be made statistically from cases to any group 
of similar objects. This is because the cases are not selected on the basis of 
statistical sampling from a well-defi ned population of possible cases. Often, this 
is because the issues studied are not suffi ciently well understood to determine the 
population, or the nature of the issues is such that it is not possible to determine 
the population precisely. For example, it is not possible to determine once and 
for all into which policy sectors it would be appropriate to integrate climate policy 
aims, or even how to divide public policy into sectors or levels; it depends on time 
and context. While statistical generalisations are not possible in case studies, 
they aim at ”analytical generalisation”, based on theory, previous knowledge and 
comparison of several cases. (Yin 1994)
This study is a multi-case study because it is based on several cases at 
several levels. It is based on studies of several countries, and in each country 
of many policies, but mostly centred on one or two, and on some regions and 
municipalities. The results can be compared and combined to give a deeper 
understanding, but it would not be useful to do this statistically. 
In case study research, a critical issue is what the chosen case is a case 
of. As stated by Bent Flyvbjerg (2006: 238): ”The goal is not to make the case 
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study be all things to all people. The goal is to allow the study to be different 
things to different people.” For those interested primarily in national climate 
policy integration, the relevant cases are the countries involved in the study, while 
for those interested in mechanisms (e.g. budgeting) or in a specifi c policy (e.g. 
fl ood management), there are cases at all levels of governance. Even though only 
some countries, regions and municipalities and a few sectors have been studied, 
generalisation can be made. These generalisations must be cautious, however, 
and take into account possible biases, e.g. this study’s focus on North-Western 
European countries. 
This report is largely based on the following country studies:
The Danish country study: • Anne Jensen and Anders Branth Pedersen 2009. 
Climate Policy Integration and Coherence in Danish Public Governance and 
in the Transport Policy Sector. Roskilde: National Environmental Research 
Institute.
The Dutch country study: • Séverine van Bommel and Wiebren Kuindersma 
2008. Policy integration, coherence and governance in Dutch climate policy. A 
multi-level analysis of mitigation and adaptation policy. Alterra-rapport 1799. 
Wageningen: Alterra.
The Finnish country study: • Paula Kivimaa and Per Mickwitz 2009. Making the 
Climate Count – Climate Policy Integration and Coherence in Finland. Finnish 
Environment N:o 3/2009, Helsinki: Finnish Environment Institute.
The German country study: • Silke Beck, Christian Kuhlicke and Christoph 
Görg 2009. Climate Policy Integration, Coherence, and Governance Germany. 
UFZ-Bericht 1/2009 Leipzig: Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research – UFZ.
The Spanish country study: • María Máñez, Francisco Aix and Nils Ferrand 
2009. Spanish Country Report and Actors’ based Assessment. Montpellier: 
Cemagref.
The UK country study: • Hugo Reinert and David Carss 2009. PEER 2: Policy 
Integration, Coherence and Governance – The UK Country Study. Edinburgh: 
The Centre for Ecology & Hydrology.
Unless otherwise stated, the empirical examples, evidence and conclusions come 
from and are based on the above-mentioned country studies. In addition to the 
above- mentioned country studies, research has also been undertaken in Bulgaria, 
France and Portugal. These studies have also informed the understanding of the 
issues in this report, but since it is unclear when and how they will be published 
no direct references to these experiences are made in this report.
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The countries studied are both diverse and similar. From a global viewpoint, 
they have common characteristics: they are all Western European democracies; 
they are all members of the European Union; and they are among the richest 
in the world, with relatively well-developed climate policies. However, they are 
also quite diverse: they differ in their natural conditions, resources and assets; 
they are differently affected by impacts of climate change; they have different 
economic and socio-cultural structure; and they have their own histories, which 
are refl ected in the current political and administrative cultures. For example, 
administrative structures vary signifi cantly. The larger countries tend to have 
more administrative tiers, which complicates efforts to achieve climate policy 
integration at all levels. In all countries, however, processes or structures are 
required to improve co-ordination between levels. Despite the country-specifi c 
differences, commonalities can be found, and it is possible to learn from the 
experiences of other countries, although differences should be kept in mind.
Box 1. Two examples of the specifi c characteristics 
of national policy culture and administrative systems
Consultation, consensus and compromise are key words in the decision-
making culture of the Netherlands. In policy-making, the national government 
not only consults decentralised governments, but interest groups are also 
incorporated informally into the policy-making process. From the viewpoint of 
the formal institutional structure, it is not surprising that there is a lot of informal 
cooperation between organisations. Responsibilities and power are spread over 
many organisations, overlapping and cutting across each other. This consensus-
centred democracy, combined with decentralization, typically reinforces policy 
integration at the regional and local level. At the higher levels of organization, 
governments avoid making clear-cut ”yes” or ”no” decisions. These decisions are 
left to the regional and local level.
Spain in particular has a highly decentralised administrative system. The 17 
Autonomous Communities (AACC) and, to a lesser extent, the local entities have 
a large degree of authority in important matters like education or health as well 
as in questions relevant to climate change such as transport or industry. The 
variety of issues on which political responsibility is shared is so vast that a new 
administrative body was created: the Environmental Sectoral Conference, which 
embodies the cooperation between central government and the AACC.
Before proceeding to an assessment of climate policy integration, it is worth 
noting that many developments have taken place since the Second World War 
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which have increased co-ordination problems in the public sector. Peters (1998) 
has stressed that the role of government has expanded, new agencies have 
been formed, decisions have been transferred from the ministries to the lower 
levels, the participation of clients as well as employers has increased, and many 
policy issues have become broader and more complex. The general co-ordination 
challenges and the attempts to address them are essential aspects of the context 
of climate policy integration. Enhancing climate policy integration and coherence 
may also be informed by and have synergies with policy efforts to address the 
general co-ordination challenges. 
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3. Policy integration 
taking place and coherence 
problems observed
This Section assesses the degree of horizontal and vertical policy integration in 
the countries studied by using the criteria developed in Chapter 2. 
3.1. Inclusion as the starting point for policy integration 
The fi rst criterion of policy integration is the inclusion of climate policy aims into 
general policies as well as sectoral policies. These aims refer to climate change 
mitigation as well as climate change adaptation.
3.1.1. Inclusion of mitigation
In most of the countries studied, climate change mitigation policy already has a 
history of about 20 to 25 years. Initially, mitigation was largely seen as a sectoral 
issue that was included in national environmental policy and/or energy policy. 
Policy integration in other policy sectors received less attention at that stage. 
Although political attention to climate change mitigation has varied over 
the years because of economic conditions, political circumstances and external 
events, in recent years a signifi cant rise in the political emphasis of mitigation has 
become evident. The increased importance of climate change is also refl ected 
in the interest that the media gives to the subject. This increase in attention 
is exemplifi ed by the statistics on climate change from six Dutch newspapers 
between 1990 and 2006 – rising from fewer than 50 articles in 1990 to almost 
600 in 2006, with a threefold increase after 2003 (Hajer 2007). Climate change 
is increasingly given priority and it is placed high on many political agendas. 
Regardless of their political background, governments and prime ministers 
have clearly declared their intention to deal with climate change. The current 
societal and political attention paid to climate change has boosted the inclusion 
of climate change in governmental programmes and strategies. In Denmark, for 
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example, the 2005 governmental programme mentioned climate change only 
six times, whereas the same coalition mentioned climate change 79 times in its 
2007 programme. In the Netherlands, the coalition government led by Jan Peter 
Balkenende mentioned climate change only once in its fi rst programme, whilst the 
current Balkenende IV government programme includes 30 references to climate 
change. At the same time, objectives for greenhouse gas reductions were not 
mentioned in the Balkenende I programme, the objective was simply to achieve 
Kyoto and EU obligations in the Balkenende II programme; whereas the target 
was raised in the Balkenende IV programme to a 30 per cent reduction in 2020 
compared to 1990. Similarly, the emphasis on climate change in the programme 
of Matti Vanhanen’s second government is greater than in any previous Finnish 
governmental programme. This increased political attention has led to the issuing 
of new and more ambitious national mitigation strategies in all of the countries 
included in the study. 
These high-level commitments strengthen the political mandate given to 
ministries and agencies to address climate change and integrate it into the policies 
and practices for which they have responsibility. It is not just through high-level 
decisions and declarations, however, that leading politicians can provide signals 
and mandates for action. By specifi c action and clear statements on particular 
issues, it is possible to infl uence discussion and action at various levels by the 
public as well as by private bodies. For example, a letter by Finnish Prime Minister 
Matti Vanhanen to the editor of the largest Finnish newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat 
(January 9, 2008), about the future of Helsinki’s energy has been cited, by civil 
servants at the national as well as local level in Finland, as a signifi cant signal of 
the importance attached to the need for to start tackling climate change. 
A general trend emerging from all of the studies is the broadening of policy 
integration in terms of sectors, actors, levels and scales. Climate change goals 
are included into a wide variety of sectors (ranging from energy, transport and 
infrastructure to innovation and technology policies and education). For example, 
whilst energy remains the focus of the 2008 Finnish national climate strategy, 
other policies are examined including: research, technology and innovation, 
education, consultation and communication, buildings and building, traffi c, spatial 
planning and community structure, waste, and agriculture and forestry. The 2005 
and 2001 Finnish strategies, by contrast, were focused just on energy policy. 
National governments are arguing more frequently that the enormous challenges 
of CO2 emission reduction, storage and capture and the promotion of sustainable 
energy cannot be met by environmental or energy policies alone. 
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Box 2. Vertical policy integration 
from the EU to the city level
In a study by Monni and Raes (2008) an ex post approach was used to follow the 
implementation of the EU climate directives at national and municipal levels and 
to identify the relevant voluntary action taken in the latter. The city of Helsinki 
was used as an example, and the study covered the directives on: 
the energy performance of buildings (2002/91/EC); • 
the promotion of cogeneration based on a useful heat demand in the • 
internal energy market (2004/8/EC);
the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources • 
(2001/77/EC);
the promotion of the use of biofuels or other renewable fuels for transport • 
(2003/30/EC) and
the landfi ll of waste (1999/31/EC). • 
The study concluded that coherence between national and municipal policies 
was greatest in regulated areas, such as waste management and building 
regulation. Voluntary action was taken at the municipal level in areas where co-
benefi ts were expected: e.g. energy conservation with economical benefi ts and 
biofuels for transportation with air-quality benefi ts. On the other hand, a clear 
confl ict was identifi ed between the EU and national renewable electricity targets 
and non-action at the city level. In that case, local conditions and private interest 
were obstacles to the implementation of a climate policy.
The increased emphasis on climate change is also refl ected in new policy 
instruments or changes of existing policy instruments. Climate policy integration 
has taken place within all types of policy instrument – regulations, economic 
instruments and information. Policy measures to promote policy integration 
will be discussed in more detail in Section 4. Generally, however, the specifi c 
measures are not of a magnitude that would be likely to bring about the declared 
policy aims. This could be due to timing, to symbolic politics or to the diffi culties 
becoming apparent when planning the specifi c instruments. Since the increased 
emphasis on climate change mitigation is recent – the most ambitious goals have 
been made in 2007 or 2008 – there has not been enough time yet to formulate 
and implement specifi c measures. The increase in attention and signifi cance 
could also be a demonstration of symbolic politics, whereby commitments are 
made in order to indicate a willingness to take the public’s concerns seriously, 
but without any real intention of implementing specifi c measures that would have 
concrete impacts on target sectors. Finally, it could well be that the saying, ”The 
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devil is in the detail,” is true; that is, trade-offs between different policy goals 
and problems of coherence become apparent only when specifi c instruments are 
negotiated.
Besides climate policy integration by national governments, there are 
several examples of regional and local governments that have included climate 
mitigation in their programmes and strategies. In many countries, e.g. Denmark, 
Finland, Germany and the United Kingdom, several municipalities have started to 
develop their own strategies for becoming ”carbon-neutral” or ”low-carbon cities”. 
In some cases, this has been the direct consequence of national incentives; 
in others, it has been mainly at their own initiative. Some large cities, e.g. 
Copenhagen, London and Rotterdam, have also formulated their own mitigation 
strategies and policies. In some cases, these policies have even preceded (in 
time) and exceeded (in ambition) national mitigation strategies. In Denmark, for 
example, climate policy has at least partly ”taken over” the role previously played 
by sustainability policies as the symbol of green policy orientation at the regional 
and municipal levels.
Box 3. Climate cities matter
Copenhagen and Rotterdam are good examples of cities which have included 
ambitious mitigation targets in their programmes and strategies. These targets 
have become an important feature of each city’s branding and international 
public relations. 
Copenhagen is due to host the 15th conference of the parties to the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP-15) in 2009. This event is 
stimulating the city to increase its efforts on climate change mitigation. The Eco-
Metropolis vision focuses on a 20 per cent reduction in CO2 emissions in 2015 
compared to 2005. Examples of concrete climate change mitigation measures 
include an expansion of the urban rail system, the city biking policy, a congestion 
charging system, the incorporation of public transport into the design of new 
neighbourhoods and the regeneration of existing buildings.
Rotterdam has initiated the Rotterdam Climate Initiative. This multi-
participant initiative is a collaboration between the municipality of Rotterdam, 
other governments, different sectors of society and members of the business 
community. The ambition is to reduce CO2 emissions by 50 per cent in 2030. The 
initiative focuses on CO2 capture and storage.
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Conclusions from the country-based studies include the following:
Climate change mitigation has become a key political issue.• 
Climate change is widely integrated into governmental programmes.• 
Wider recognition in the countries studied of the need for climate policy • 
integration if the more ambitious climate change mitigation commitments are 
to be achieved.
Cities and municipalities have also integrated climate aims in their strategies • 
and in specifi c measures. Their goals are sometimes more ambitious than 
those of their respective countries.
3.1.2. Inclusion of adaptation
During early policy discussions on climate 
change the focus was almost solely on 
mitigation, while adaptation to climate 
change was perceived as a non- or 
marginal issue. This can be explained 
by the reluctance of the politicians 
and other members of society who 
were advocating emissions reduc-
tions to accept climate change as 
an ”inevitable” fact, which could be 
interpreted as implying that there would 
be no need to act in terms of mitigation. 
Advocates in some countries thus feared that 
climate change adaptation would lead policy-
makers to the relinquishing or lowering of mitigation 
targets. The mere idea of adapting to climate change was problematic for those 
advocating emissions reductions, and was treated ”with the same distaste that 
the religious right reserves for sex education in schools” (from Pielke et al. 2007). 
The attitude is exemplifi ed by former US Vice-President Al Gore’s statement: 
”Believing that we can adapt to just about anything is ultimately a kind of laziness, 
an arrogant faith in our ability to react in time to save our skin.” (Gore 2000, 240) 
Recently, however, perceptions of the role of adaptation and policies designed 
to enhance it have changed – as demonstrated by both the Stern Review (2006) 
and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007). As a result, national 
adaptation plans and strategies have either been created or are under preparation 
in most EU countries in 2005–2008 (for an overview see Swart et al. 2009). 
The inclusion, and ultimately the integration, of climate change adaptation 
in other policy sectors is a major issue in national adaptation strategies. Unlike 
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the case with mitigation, these national strategies do not attempt to establish an 
adaptation policy sector. There is a growing awareness that successful adaptation 
to climate change will depend on policy integration in other sectoral policies such 
as the policies for water, waste management, energy supply, spatial planning, 
transport and infrastructure. Not surprisingly, most countries focus mostly on 
integrating adaptation policy into policy sectors that have already been affected by 
extreme weather events. The risk here is that climate change adaptation focuses 
only on the visible issues – water and drought – and other adaptation issues 
related to agriculture, forestry, impacts on ecosystems, and natural habitats, for 
example, are neglected.
The fact that most adaptation strategies have been issued very recently 
could lead to the conclusion that most countries have not been adapting to climate 
change until now. The case studies demonstrate that this is not necessarily the 
case. Recently, many countries have experienced extreme weather conditions, viz: 
an increase in the volume and intensity of rainfall and river fl ooding (Germany, the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark); water shortages and drought (Spain 
and the south of France); heatwaves (France and Germany); and an extremely mild 
winter (Finland). Storms, extreme rainfall and droughts have always occurred, but 
climate change is expected to increase the frequency and intensity of extreme 
weather conditions, and recent events have already been interpreted as impacts 
of climate change. This has led to adaptation measures “avant la lettre” or 
adaptation strategies without using this term. In different countries extreme 
events have been used to make a compelling case that climate change is already 
taking place and will have catastrophic impacts. Examples are the fl ooding of the 
rivers Rhine and Meuse in the Netherlands (1993 and 1995) and the Elbe and the 
Mulde (2002) in Germany. 
Box 4. Policy reactions to extreme fl ooding in the 
Netherlands and Germany
The extreme fl ooding of rivers in the Netherlands (1993 and 1995) and in 
Eastern Germany (2002) caused a lot of damage and attracted a lot of political 
and public attention. The government’s policy responses in both countries 
show a remarkable resemblance. In both countries, the national or regional 
government responded quickly after the events by taking technical measures. 
These measures consisted mostly of technical and visible projects: such as the 
construction of new dams or higher dykes – which could be relied upon to gain 
substantial public support, shortly after the disastrous events. 
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Adaptation strategies require co-ordination at both the horizontal and vertical 
level. Climate change can have very different consequences for different regions. 
Many responses to adaptation issues require tailor-made solutions at the regional 
or local level instead of standardised national solutions. This does not mean, 
however, that the national government is not involved in these regional and local 
solutions; but it does indicate the need for co-ordination and integration into an 
overall policy framework. One reason for national involvement is the fact that 
many adaptation issues are cross-sectoral, multi-level problems that require not 
only horizontal and vertical policy integration but also new forms of multi-level 
governance.
Conclusions from the country-based studies 
include the following: 
Adaptation has only recently become a legitimate and important policy issue and • 
national adaptation strategies have recently been issued in the studied countries.
Policy integration is at the heart of adaptation strategies. National governments • 
intend to implement adaptation policies mainly through other policies.
Extreme weather events in some countries have already triggered the integration • 
of adaptation into strategies for specifi c policy sectors and the implementation 
of visible measures in particular.
3.2. Consistency between policies promoting 
climate objectives and advancing other aims 
The question of consistency between climate objectives and other policy goals is 
rarely discussed in the general strategies of the countries included in the study. 
There is even a tendency to conceal inconsistencies between climate change 
issues and other issues, while potential synergies are highlighted. 
During the 1990s, concerns about the declining competitiveness of 
European industry in relation to that of North American and Asian competitors 
increased. Under the umbrella of sustainable development, ecological, economic 
and social issues were reframed to become complementary rather than 
contradictory objectives. Against this background, it has come to light recently that 
properly designed environmental standards do not restrain economic growth but 
can trigger innovation and even stimulate the national economy. Environmental 
regulation can induce innovation by making industries aware of and willing to 
exploit opportunities which would otherwise be missed. According to this view, 
win-win opportunities can benefi t industry and the environment alike and result 
in environmental benefi ts and increased competitiveness. This framework was 
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instrumental in reframing climate change from a threatening global risk to an 
economic opportunity (Section 5.3). 
In recent years, governments committed to integrating climate change into 
sectoral policies have developed a novel approach to policy ”co-ordination.” In 
Germany, for example, top-down and restrictive state interventions in production, 
consumption or transport structures have been increasingly contested and 
challenged by strong opposition from powerful target groups. As a result, climate 
policy integration has not taken place on issues where stakes were high and vital 
interests strongly affected. The rationale of the new approach is to decouple 
climate policies from the negative image created by restrictive policies, including 
prohibitions and bans. The underlying philosophy is that climate policy can 
succeed only when those in positions of responsibility in research, trade and 
industry, the political sector, government and civil society mobilize all available 
resources and pull in the same direction. As the German Integrated Energy and 
Climate Programme demonstrates, sectoral, bottom-up, decentralized approaches 
to policy integration may help to enhance policy coherence if they lead target 
groups to reduce their opposition and motivate them to cooperate and to assume 
responsibility for implementation targets.
Box 5. Seeking innovations and competitive advantage 
through climate policies
In Germany the 2005 coalition agreement viewed climate change as ”a 
driving force for: developing and marketing future-oriented technologies 
worldwide, enhancing energy and resource productivity and thus boosting 
the competitiveness of the German economy, creating new and secure jobs 
for well-qualifi ed workers”. The German approach can be characterised by its 
strong focus on the potential of technological innovations to solve environmental 
problems (Jänicke and Jacob 2006). It is based on the dual strategy of increasing 
effi ciency and expanding the use of renewable energies and regenerative 
raw materials and thus broadening the energy mix. The implementation of 
this approach in practice has changed from a broad focus on sustainable 
development to a narrower focus on climate policy integration. An innovation-
oriented climate policy also includes a pro-active government, demanding 
targets and a mix of instruments which infl uence the entire innovation cycle from 
initial research to achieving success on global markets. It combines economic 
policy instruments to indicate general directions, e.g. through emissions trading, 
and regulations. By becoming a forerunner, Germany aims to gain competitive 
advantages over other countries.
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In the Netherlands, industrial sectors take part in the sustainability 
agreement signed with the government in 2007. Sector-specifi c ”strategic 
roadmaps” or innovation agendas will be used to analyse how a target of 50 per 
cent energy savings in the production chain can be achieved by 2030. One idea 
in the Dutch 2007 ”Clean and Effi cient” mitigation programme is that standards 
that become stricter in the course of time stimulate innovations. Global and 
European standards would be preferable from a competitiveness point of view, 
but domestic standards can also be used in certain sectors – for new buildings, 
for example.
In the new (2008) Finnish Climate and Energy Strategy, research into and 
development of technologies and innovations is the fi rst sector dealt with in the 
section on policy instruments and measures. The starting points are the export 
potential of and existing R&D traditions in energy production. The recent, more 
general perspective which stresses customer- and demand-based innovation 
policy is also refl ected, however. The establishment of Strategic Centres for 
Science, Technology and Innovation (SHOKs), especially in respect of energy and 
environment, is stressed. The strategy is very general, however, in specifying 
the nature of the innovation policy measures that will be taken. The challenge of 
achieving the stated aims will be huge, given the lack of climate policy integration 
in the 2008 National Innovation Strategy and the complete absence of climate 
change in the 2009 budget proposal for innovation policy, including the budget 
for the Finnish Funding Agency of Technology and Innovation (Tekes). Irrespective 
of the lack of climate policy integration in the National Innovation Strategy and in 
the state budget, Tekes includes climate change in its 2008 strategic defi nitions.
Despite the fact that the country studies focus on very different policy sectors 
(forestry, water management and transport), land use related questions appear to 
be a common source of confl ict. This arises because land use in support of climate 
change mitigation or adaptation often competes with land use for other purposes. 
The lack of consistency can be explained in part by attempts to take into account 
and reconcile contrary political aims – such as economic development and nature 
conservation. The confl ict between the goal of using biofuels to mitigate climate 
change and the goals of biodiversity as well as food production are common in 
several countries. Inconsistencies are also related to land use confl icts where 
adaptation would require areas to be used for water retention and other uses 
such as urban development or where industry would like to use the same space. 
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Box 6. Trade-offs and confl icts between 
climate policy and land use aims
In the Netherlands, many trade-offs and confl icts between climate policy and 
other policies are concerned with land use and spatial planning. Adaptation 
measures, in particular, claim more space for water and dykes. In general, these 
claims compete with the space needed for agriculture, nature conservation, 
housing and other purposes. However, in some cases, these claims can be 
combined. An example is water storage in nature conservation areas. In some 
areas this is clearly possible, while in other areas it would be disastrous for the 
specifi c nature reserve. The Zuidplaspolder case of the Dutch country study even 
shows that water storage, housing and nature conservation could go hand-in-
hand in the deepest polder in the Netherlands. Some national politicians wanted 
to prevent this apparent inconsistency with national climate change adaptation 
policy. However, specifi c research in this case showed that these combinations 
were possible and even had advantages for climate change adaptation as 
compared to the previous agricultural land use. 
Consistency is also relevant when it comes to the relationship between mitigation 
and adaptation. Whilst in some countries, the two were initially perceived as being 
contradictory and exclusionary options, adaptation to impacts of climate change 
that are no longer avoidable today is seen as a second, complementary pillar 
of contemporary climate policy which supports the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions. There is now widespread recognition that combating climate change 
requires a combination of mitigation and adaptation measures – although they 
may compete for the same resources and political attention and some adaptation 
measures may make mitigation harder and vice versa.
Conclusions from the country-based studies include the following:
There are many inconsistencies between climate policy aims and other policy • 
aims in the countries included in the study. 
In most countries and sectors the trade-offs between the aims of climate policy • 
and other aims are rarely openly assessed or are not fully known (this applies 
to adaptation in particular). 
Strategies designed to deal with inconsistencies involve describing them as • 
innovations or synergies or displacing them to other (usually lower) levels of 
decision making. 
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3.3. Weighting of climate aims
In cases where trade-offs persist and 
choices have to be made, the weight 
given to climate aims becomes crucial. 
Weighting is therefore an important cri-
terion for assessing the degree of policy 
integration. It indicates the real strength 
of the willingness to implement declared 
commitments. Since 2007 in particular, in the 
countries included in study, climate has become 
one of the key issues of governmental policies, along 
with employment, competitiveness and regional develop-
ment, but these issues are usually not explicitly prioritised against each other.
Box 7. Implicit and explicit weighting of climate aims
In Finland, the analysis of key government strategies shows that the inclusion 
of climate aims into those strategies is extensive. Recognition of the need for 
action has not yet resulted in specifi c measures that would be comparable in 
stringency to the magnitude of the climate change challenge or the commitments 
made. It may partly be an issue of timing: after the new Climate and Energy 
Strategy (2008), specifi c and suffi cient measures may follow. Yet it may also be 
a signal that the political weighting of climate policy might still not be suffi cient 
when climate policy aims are in confl ict with other political aims.
In the Netherlands, attaching a greater weight to climate policy over other 
policy issues is not a well developed feature of national policy. In many cases, 
the national government leaves a lot of space for other governments (adaptation) 
or target groups (mitigation) to prioritize climate issues over other policy aims. 
Critics suggest that the ambitious climate policy aims are merely symbolic, 
devoid of any real support as regards enforcement or implementation. Others 
believe that other governments and target groups will attach a greater weight 
to climate policy over other interests on a voluntary basis. The recent advice of 
the Delta Commission (2008) on water safety suggests that, in the near future, 
water-related climate change adaptation seems to be outweighing (almost) all 
other policy aims such as housing and agriculture. The reason for this is mainly 
the fear of a future rise in the sea-level and severe fl ooding in the low-lying delta 
of the Netherlands. However, this advice has not yet been translated into real 
policy strategies and is still the subject of political discussion.
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Detailed implementation plans or suffi -
ciently extensive fi nancial commit-
ments to climate change by gov-
ernments are frequently absent 
in the countries included in the 
study – which can be seen 
as an implicit indication that 
climate change is a rather 
weak priority. Weighting is 
an important factor, espe-
cially when decisions on 
specifi c measures are taken 
and resources are allocated. 
The current fi scal and eco-
nomic crisis will increase the role 
of weighting since controversies 
as to which issue should be given 
priority and how scarce resources should 
be allocated and distributed will intensify. 
The degree of policy integration is also 
dependent on the position and the relative weight and power of ministries or 
persons in charge. Environment ministries often lack the standing and weight of 
more infl uential departments – such as ministries of economic affairs – within 
government and thus in any inter-departmental negotiations. When climate 
change became a prominent issue in Germany in 2007, Chancellor Angela Merkel 
and Environment Minister Sigmar Gabriel used the “window of opportunity”, made 
climate change “a matter for the boss” and demonstrated a willingness to take 
political leadership and to push climate policies. This increased the support shown 
by the entire government, and many ministries markedly increased their efforts 
to implement targets in their respective sectors. It has also become evident that 
the way in which authority and responsibility for the formulation of targets and 
implementation are defi ned and distributed does matter. 
 
Summarising the fi ndings of the country studies:
Climate policy aims and other policy aims are usually not explicitly prioritised • 
against each other in governmental programmes and strategies.
When climate change becomes a “matter for the boss”, climate policy gains • 
more political weight. 
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The frequent lack of implementation plans, specifi c and stringent instruments • 
and fi nancial resources for climate aims indicates that, in practice, such aims 
are often still outweighed by other policy aims. 
3.4. Reporting for accountability and policy development
Reporting is important for climate policy integration because it can improve 
accountability and learning. Public policies frequently result in unintended side-
effects, and their intended impacts may be absent or far smaller than expected. 
This can be due to wrong assumptions as a basis for the policies; implementation, 
i.e. what was delivered was not what was planned; or changing contexts, which 
imply that policy outputs interact with factors other than those foreseen. In order 
to learn about lacking intended effects as well as side-effects policy integration 
requires feedback, i.e. reporting becomes an important criterion. It is particularly 
important in the case of climate change because of the uncertainties and 
complexity of the systems involved. The “reporting” criterion addresses the degree 
to which mitigation and adaptation strategies and policy instruments specify ex 
ante how their impact on climate change aims are to be followed up and reported. 
Reporting also refers to the information on climate change mitigation and adoption 
actually included in ex post evaluations of strategies and policy instruments. 
All European countries have well-established monitoring of e.g. emissions, 
temperatures and rising sea levels. We now need to link this into assessments 
of policy options before decisions are made and retrospective evaluations of the 
policies implemented. For example, monitoring CO2 emissions from traffi c and the 
numbers of cars is not enough to be able to evaluate whether integrating climate 
aims into instruments such as car taxation or spatial planning is working as planned. 
In addition to data, assessment and evaluation requires an understanding of the 
essential socio-economic and environmental processes behind climate change 
mitigation and adaptation. 
In general, the country studies reveal that evaluations are performed, but 
that there is much room for improvement regarding both ex ante assessments 
and ex post evaluations of climate change mitigation and adaptation measures. 
Furthermore, lack of relevant data will always constitute a problem. Sometimes, 
there might be national data available, while regional or local data are absent – 
as, for example, in the case study of the Mulde fl ood management in Germany 
and in Valencia in the Spanish country study.
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Box 8. Reporting in Dutch climate policy 
The Netherlands has a long-standing and strong tradition in policy evaluation (ex 
post and ex ante). Examples of ex ante evaluations that have been intensively 
used in numerous policy strategies are the climate scenarios of the Dutch 
Meteorology Institute (KNMI) and the National Environmental Assessment 
Agency (MNP). More specifi c ex ante evaluations are the EIA-reports on strategic 
government plans and specifi c projects. Ex post evaluations of policy strategies/
policy measures have been increasingly included in policy documents. In some 
cases these evaluations are performed while the policy implementation is still 
in progress. These evaluations tend to focus more on policy learning than on 
accountability. 
Specifi c to adaptation is the uncertainty of the impacts of climate change. 
The Delta Commission (2008), which advised on adaptation in the water sector, 
has also acknowledged the uncertainty of climate change and its effects on the 
sea level. Remarkably, the committee based their advice on the most extreme 
climate scenarios. Their assumption is that adaptation (on water issues) could 
then be spread over 100 years (and more). Meanwhile, new climate scenarios 
and information on the consequences of climate change should be used to fi ne 
tune and adjust the initial policy aims and measures. Their message is that if we 
start to adapt now based on the most extreme scenarios, there is enough time to 
adjust the adaptation strategy in line with new scientifi c insights.
The German country study further demonstrates that institutional 
constraints can block effective evaluations. A systematic assessment of political 
actions is lacking in Germany since it is not embedded into the national policy style. 
Frequently, evaluations are conducted by the same ministries, or departments in 
charge of implementation without much insight or independence. Needless to say, 
if the evaluation procedure is performed behind closed doors, and, in particular, 
if the target group for the regulation is involved in the evaluation process, there 
is a risk of a biased evaluation. A related problem is that the ministries which 
represent the interests of groups targeted in respect of emissions of greenhouse 
gases might be reluctant to make objective and open evaluations of the effects of 
their respective sectoral policies on climate change mitigation or adaptation. One 
solution might be to create new units such as the Danish Climate Co-ordination 
Forum, which is allocated evaluation tasks.
Reporting is an important aspect of policy integration and may reveal 
whether declared integration is mainly symbolic or really intended to be effective. 
At the same time, reporting should not be used as a criterion for policy integration 
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without taking the national evaluation context 
into account. Whilst some European coun-
tries (e.g. the Netherlands, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom) introduced poli-
cy evaluation widely in the 1960s, it 
was only a decade or so ago that 
policy evaluation emerged in other 
countries (e.g. Finland and Spain). 
This is still refl ected in the general 
inclusion of evaluation in policy, 
in the resources for undertaking 
evaluations and in the processes 
for using them. (Furubo and Sandahl 
2002) 
Summarising the fi ndings of the country-
based studies:
Most countries still struggle with the issue of how • 
to combine monitoring, policy evaluation and policy learning. 
Meanwhile, developments in respect of climate policy are often dominated by • 
uncertainties about the extent of the problem, its consequences and the impact 
of policy measures. This calls for policy development and policy implementation 
to be informed by experience. 
3.5. Resources to take climate change into account
Effi cient climate policy integration requires resources. The know-how available and 
the fi nancial resources allocated for this task are thus a sign of its signifi cance. In 
the country studies we assessed the form of inclusion, as well as the promotion 
and generation of knowledge and know-how involved in climate policies. An 
additional factor was the fi nancial resource allocated for climate policies. The 
third theme concerned the number of civil servants and climate experts who work 
with climate-related policies at national, regional and local levels of governance.
The country studies reveal diverse approaches and strengths in knowledge 
building. In two countries, the recognition of a greater need for climate change 
research implies that a climate research co-ordination unit has been set up, 
as shown in the Danish and the German country studies. The UK and Germany 
have long-standing experience in climate modelling, as does the Netherlands in 
impacts research. 
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Concerning adaptation, it is noteworthy that governments usually follow 
the pathways set by areas that have experienced extreme events which can be 
ascribed to climate change. Backed by its particular geographical features, the 
Netherlands, for example, has a strong research focus on issues related to water, 
such as fl ooding etc; it also recognizes the importance of tacit local knowledge 
and traditional practices and culture.
The focus on knowledge production and applying it to policies is linked 
to the way in which climate change issues are represented as climate change 
problems that require political responses. Most of the research targets natural 
science-based knowledge on current and future changes in specifi c geographical 
areas and within particular policy sectors (e.g. agriculture or water supply) or the 
estimates of forecast costs and benefi ts of particular climate changes. Little 
attention is generally paid to migration issues, regional security policies in regions 
with potential water shortages or cultural and everyday life adaptation issues, for 
example, with the exception of the Netherlands. 
Finally, concerning fi nancial resources, in all of the countries included in the 
study, climate policy issues over the past few years have been allocated resources 
in both national and local budgets. In Spain, the majority of the resources are 
allocated to mitigation measures. In Denmark, the establishment of a climate 
ministry for climate policies in itself represents substantial resources. All of this, 
however, does not prevent many cases – in the Netherlands, for example – in 
which there seems to be a substantial gap between the resources budgeted for 
and those actually required in order for measures to be implemented.
Conclusions from the country-based studies include the following:
In the countries studied, climate policy issues in recent years have been • 
allocated resources in both national and local budgets. It remains to be seen 
how permanent those resources will be, however. 
Hitherto, most research has been natural science-based and centred on • 
increasing knowledge about e.g. current and futures changes in specifi c 
geographical areas and within particular policy sectors. 
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4. Measures and means 
to enhance climate policy 
integration and improve 
policy coherence
Based on the previous section, it is obvious that additional means – such as 
institutions, procedures or measures – will be required in order enhance climate 
policy integration and improve policy coherence. These means will need to be 
formed within the context of multi-level governance. This section will start with a 
brief overview of the types of means available followed by subsections on some 
of the most interesting options – that is, impact assessments, the annual budget, 
spatial planning and cross-compliance. 
4.1. Many means exist to enhance 
climate policy integration and improve coherence
Based on their broad studies of environmental policy integration in 30 OECD 
countries, Klaus Jacob, Axel Volkery and Andrea Lenschow (2008) have classifi ed 
the variety of instruments used into three categories:
communicative instruments, such as inclusion in the constitution, environmental • 
and sustainable development strategies, requirements for sectoral strategies, 
obligations to report performance and external and independent reviews of 
performance;
organisational instruments, such as combinations of departments, green • 
cabinets, environmental units within sectoral departments and independent 
working groups; and 
procedural instruments, such as veto or obligatory consultation rights for • 
environmental departments, green budgeting and impact assessment.
The countries studied have already introduced instruments of all three types. 
Climate issues are widely included in governmental programmes, in environmental 
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and sustainable development strategies and in climate strategies for mitigation 
as well as adaptation (Section 3.1). Communicative instruments have thus largely 
been introduced. Most countries have created new organisations to deal with 
climate change in general or to enhance policy integration in particular. Denmark 
has established a new ministry, Spain and the United Kingdom new ministerial 
departments. In Finland ministerial task forces on climate and energy policy 
have been appointed. Many countries have established new research institutes 
and appointed climate specialists or councils. There are thus a huge variety of 
organisational instruments. In addition, some procedural instruments have been 
used for the purposes of climate policy integration, but so far most countries have 
not introduced new climate specifi c procedural instruments; rather, they have 
tried to integrate climate into existing procedures. The procedural instruments – 
impact assessments, the annual budget, spatial planning and cross-compliance 
– will be discussed in more detail in the following sub-sections.
Climate policy integration may be promoted either by the creation of new 
institutions and instruments or by the reframing of existing ones. Most countries 
have created organisations for climate research or brokers between research 
and decision-makers. For example, Germany has established several institutions, 
including the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), the Potsdam 
Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), the Expertise Centre for climate change 
effects and adaptation (KomPass) and the German Climate Research Center 
(DKRZ). Finland has chosen a different approach and, instead of establishing 
new institutions, has broadened the mandates of established research institutes. 
Thus there now exist climate groups, projects or programmes at, for example, the 
VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, the Finnish Meteorological Institute, 
the Finnish Forest Research Institute and the Finnish Environment Institute. 
Some new instruments – for example, the Climate Change Act adopted by the 
United Kingdom in November 2008 – have also been widely discussed as an 
example by other countries. There are also many proposed options that have not 
been deeply scrutinised. For example, the proposal for a climate ombudsman 
presented in Finland or the proposal to link the bonuses or the general wages of 
civil servants to their own organisations’ CO2 emissions or to their impacts on the 
national emissions (Mickwitz et al. 2008a). 
Box 9. The United Kingdom Climate Change Act
The Climate Change Bill was announced in the Queen’s Speech in November 
2006, following an early day motion passed immediately after the 2005 election 
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and signed by 412 of the 646 Members of Parliament (MPs). Only three other 
such motions have ever been signed by more than 400 MPs. The Bill was 
published in draft form in March 2007, introduced in Parliament in November 
2007 and then completed the various stages of its passage through Parliament 
in November 2008. It was approved and received Royal Assent – the fi nal 
formality, turning it from a Bill into an Act – on November 26, 2008. 
The overall aims of the Act are to move the UK towards a low-carbon 
economy and demonstrate UK leadership internationally. The Act lays out a 
framework for the fi rst aim by setting a statutory target of 80 per cent emission 
reductions by 2050 against a 1990 baseline, across all six Kyoto greenhouse 
gases, and granting the Government powers to introduce the measures required 
to meet these targets – e.g. new trading schemes and fi nancial incentive 
programmes – through secondary legislation. An interim target of a 26 per 
cent reduction in CO2 emissions by 2020 is being reviewed in the light of the 
government move – at a late stage in the passage of the Bill – to include all 
greenhouse gases and raise the 2050 target from 60 to 80 per cent. Emissions 
will be regulated through fi ve-year carbon budgets that set binding limits on 
emissions, backed up by annual accountability and independent scrutiny. 
Three of these budgets will be in place at any time, giving a 15-year planning 
time-frame. The fi rst three budgets, to be set by June 2009, cover the periods 
from 2008–2013, 2013–2017 and 2017–2022. International aviation and 
shipping emissions are to be included in the Act by December 31, 2012, or the 
government must account for the exclusion to Parliament. Projected emissions 
from the two sectors must be taken into account in the calculation of carbon 
budgets.
The Act also establishes the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) as an 
independent body to monitor and provide advice on progress towards targets 
set out in the Act. In particular, the Committee will advise the government on 
the inclusion of emissions from international aviation and shipping, and on the 
appropriate balance between action at domestic, European and international 
levels for each budget period. In its fi nal stages, the Bill was amended to require 
a limit on the purchase of credits for each budgetary period, to be established 
through secondary legislation requiring debate in both Houses of Parliament. 
Other measures covered in the Act relate to biofuels, the introduction of fi nancial 
incentive schemes for household waste and powers to require a minimum charge 
for single-use carrier bags. On adaptation, the Act requires the government to 
report every fi ve years on risks arising from climate change, and introduces 
powers for government to require public bodies and statutory undertakers to 
carry out risk assessments and develop appropriate risk-management plans.
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In addition but related to the question of whether to reform existing institutions 
and instruments or to establish new ones is the question of the degree to which 
climate policy integration should be based on specifi c institutions and how 
much it may rely on either institutions for environmental policy integration or on 
institutions to provide general coherence of public policies. If extended emphasis 
were to be put on external and independent review of climate performance, 
would that require a new institution or could it be undertaken by an institution 
that carries out general environmental auditing or by the general auditors? These 
questions will be further discussed later on (Section 5.5) but they are an essential 
aspect of the specifi c measures discussed in the sub-sections below. 
4.2. Making impact assessments climate inclusive
Different types of impact assessment can potentially be important instruments for 
climate policy integration. All European countries use ex ante impact assessments 
of policy proposals, strategies and plans. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
of projects is the oldest and most institutionalised procedure. The EU adopted 
the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive in 1985. Although plans were 
to some degree included in the EIA Directive, the scope was widened when the 
Directive on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on 
the environment (the SEA Directive 2001/42/EC) entered into force in July 2004. 
The history of Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) is largely related to policies to 
promote competitiveness and deregulation – as in the Netherlands, for example, 
where it started from the formulation of the “Competitiveness, deregulation, and 
legislative quality” programme. The EU has promoted RIA as part of its strategy 
to improve regulation (COM 2005 97). For new EU regulations the Commission 
adopted new guidelines for impact assessment in 2005 (SEC 2005 791). The 
impact assessments of the proposed EU regulations are to be based on an 
integrated careful analysis of potential economic, social and environmental 
impacts. The focus of the guidelines is, however, largely on economic analysis, 
especially with regard to potential effects on competitiveness. Analyses of the 
practice of the new system has argued that it could marginalise the environment, 
but there are also signs of increased transparency and possibilities for learning 
(Hertin et al. 2008).
Making impact assessment important for climate policy integration requires 
fi rst that the links, direct and indirect, between a project, strategy or regulation 
and climate change be recognised. The ability to recognise these links depends 
on the understanding of the processes in place. If potential climate impacts 
can be foreseen, their more specifi c assessment depends on the availability of 
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comprehensive and reliable data as well 
as the development of assessment and 
performance tools. The tools may be 
advanced, such as models; formal, 
such as cost-benefi t analyses or 
risk assessments; or simple, such 
as check lists (e.g. Nilsson et al. 
2008). Finally, the role of impact 
assessments depends largely on 
whether they are conducted in 
such a way that they actually be-
come used. Practical experiences 
establish that successful policy inte-
gration is not only a question of rein-
venting new frameworks and tools but also 
of enhancing existing capacities and putting 
them into practice effectively. At the same time there 
is a growing awareness that policies do not necessarily require more accurate 
and specifi c predictions from climate models, for example, as modellers tend to 
suggest. For example, in the case of fl ood management, increased accuracy and 
more precise predictions are not really necessary in order for decisions to be 
made. There is a need to examine the kind of knowledge and information required 
and relevant from the point of view of decision-makers at different levels, and 
take this into account when planning impact assessments. 
Until recently, climate change has not in general played a major role in 
environmental impact assessments (EIAs) of projects. Climate change mitigation 
has been an important issue in the EIAs mainly of large energy-demanding 
projects, power plants or traffi c infrastructure. In many cases, the results of the 
impact assessments depend on how they are focused. Examples from Denmark 
and Finland show studies that have argued that new infrastructure, e.g. a road or 
a bridge, would reduce CO2 emissions because traffi c would become smoother, 
but have not considered possible increases in traffi c volumes due to the smoother 
traffi c. In the Netherlands a working group has been working on making the EIA 
(both for projects and plans) climate proof. It gave recommendations concerning 
climate change mitigation as well as adaptation. 
In Finland, the emphasis on impact assessments of national programmes 
increased after 1999, when the Chancellor of Justice required a more thorough 
environmental assessment of the national forest programme. In practice, there 
has been a large variation in the choice of assessment approach, as well as in the 
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role of climate change in the assessments carried out. For example, the strategic 
environmental assessment of the national forest programme in 1999 did not 
directly evaluate climate impacts, whilst in the assessment of the new national 
forest programme in 2007, climate change was extensively acknowledged 
(Mickwitz et al. 2008a). Similar variations have been observed in Denmark 
as well. In Finland the most thorough assessments utilising advanced tools, 
such as macroeconomic and energy system models, have been carried out as 
assessments of the three national climate and energy programmes (2001, 2005 
and 2008). There remain, however, a number of programmes and plans of which 
climate impacts are either not assessed at all or only incompletely assessed at 
the planning stage. 
Virtually every European country has set up legislation, procedures, 
guidelines and sometimes institutions for Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA). 
Even if a discourse about regulatory impact assessment in the context of “better 
regulation” has emerged across Europe, the content and use of the RIA concept 
varies signifi cantly in different countries and have not yet converged (Radaelli 
2005). For example, even if the duty to assess possible impacts of a bill exists in 
Germany it is not seriously implemented and effectively integrated into regulatory 
structures at different levels of decision making. As part of the Dutch RIA there 
is an environmental test (E-test), the aim of which is to identify the potential 
impacts on the environment. Its impacts on decision making in practice have 
been considered limited. In most countries each ministry’s RIAs are carried on by 
departmental offi cials, sometimes with the support of external consultants. The 
resources provided by research institutes or consultants vary – between countries, 
departments and cases. Whilst the Netherlands has two units responsible for 
quality control of RIAs, no such system exists yet in Finland, for example. The 
challenges for the RIAs are thus to include climate aspects in the RIA (even if 
there is an E-test this does not always mean that all climate change aspects are 
taken into account) and to make sure that this inclusion is not merely symbolic 
but actually infl uences decision making.
In addition to the impact assessment procedures established in all of the 
countries included in the study, the Netherlands has the Water test, which could 
become important especially for adaptation to climate change. The aims of the 
Water test are to guarantee that water interests are taken into account in spatial 
and land use planning, so that negative effects on the water system are prevented 
or compensated for elsewhere. This integration of water in spatial planning works 
in two ways: a plan is assessed on its implications for the water system and the 
constraints that the water system puts on land use are made explicit. Currently 
the Water test does not include climate change objectives; nor does it include 
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the means by which to weigh climate change objectives against other policy 
objectives. New legislation with regard to the Dutch Water test, incorporating 
climate change, is expected. 
4.3. Utilising the annual budget as a climate policy instrument
The annual budget – of the EU, states and municipalities – infl uences climate change 
mitigation and adaptation in many ways. First, it provides the resources for the 
public institutions that provide information for, plan or implement climate policies 
and integrate climate-related aims into sectoral policies. Second, on the income 
side of the budget, some taxes and charges are designed to enhance mitigation. 
Third, on the expenses side, some subsidies are designed to promote mitigation, 
e.g. subsidies for renewable energy. In addition to the intended climate impacts, 
the budget also has unintended climate impacts, as a result of behavioural change 
induced by taxes and public expenditure, so-called unintended consequences of 
planned action. These unintended climate impacts may be benefi cial or harmful 
from the point of view of climate change mitigation and adaptation. For example, 
publicly fi nanced traffi c infrastructure may contribute to increased or decreased 
CO2 emissions depending on the type of infrastructure (highway vs. railway) and 
the context. Not only are the stipulations directly included in the budget important, 
but also the detailed rules set out in e.g. tax laws or the instructions guiding their 
implementation. Obvious examples are energy tax exemptions for some sectors 
that all countries have. 
There are fi ve ways in which climate could be better integrated in the budget 
proposals:
climate-based taxes and charges could be increased and new taxes • 
introduced;
climate-based subsidies and budget allocations could be increased or new • 
ones introduced;
subsidies and taxes with harmful climate impacts could be removed or • 
redesigned;
budget allocations and taxes with favourable side effects from a climate point • 
of view could be increased; and
rules and texts stipulating the way in which present budget allocations may be • 
used could be more climate-based by stipulating climate-based limits or goals 
for the administrative bodies that govern these means.
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In the countries included in the study, the history of utilising taxation to promote 
climate change mitigation is a lengthy one. Even in the early 1990s, individual 
climate-based taxes were introduced, such as the Finnish and Danish CO2-based 
fuel taxes in 1990 and 1992. Some, more comprehensive ecological tax reforms, 
with climate as a central aspect, have also been undertaken, such as the German 
ecological tax reform by the Red-Green government under Schroeder in 1999 and 
2000. 
Although a few new climate-based taxes have been introduced in recent 
years, there is in many countries a reluctance to utilise taxation as a policy 
instrument in general as well as for climate policy purposes. For example, the ”no-
new-taxes” policy of the present Danish government has blocked initiatives for a 
congestion charging scheme. In Germany, the present government has declared 
that it ”will not raise the eco-tax further” and that ”the current eco-tax relief 
regulations for the industry will be retained”. Contrary to the current Danish and 
German reluctance, the Dutch government has recently introduced several new 
taxes, such as a tax on air tickets and a higher tax on electricity (fi rst taxation) and 
diesel. The Dutch aim is, however, to redirect the revenue from these additional 
measures as much as possible to result in a shift rather than in an increase in the 
burden of taxation. 
Box 10. Using taxation to reduce CO2 emissions from traffi c
The Dutch government has introduced several new taxes related to traffi c, such 
as a higher tax on the acquisition of new cars with high CO2 emissions and a 
lower tax on cars with low emissions and a bonus for fuel-effi cient company cars. 
In Finland a new CO2-based vehicle taxation was adopted in 2007 and 
entered into force from the beginning of 2008. The Finnish Government’s report 
on long-term transport policy to the Parliament (2008) also identifi es taxation as 
one of the measures through which the use of environmentally friendly vehicle- 
and fuel technology could be promoted. Measures that have been discussed 
and studied, but not yet adopted are, for example, a climate-based reform of the 
rules for deduction of the travel expenses for the trips between home and work 
from taxable income and a climate-based reform of the taxation of company 
cars.
In Germany a signifi cant tax reduction for fuel-effi cient cars was introduced 
in 1997. A reform of vehicle tax on the basis of CO2 is included in the German 
Integrated Energy and Climate Programme of 2007. This measure has not 
yet been implemented, however. Another planned measure, that of coupling 
automobile registration costs with the amount of CO2 vehicles emit, has 
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been tabled indefi nitely. The German government tends to justify the delay in 
implementing key elements in terms of open, yet-to-be determined negotiations 
at different levels of decision making such as the EU. It argues that it is waiting 
until the framework and directives/guidelines are adopted at the European level 
and appropriate binding CO2 values are introduced, which must be anchored 
legally at the EU level. At the same time, the delay also mirrors resistance 
by affected industries and stakeholders or confl icts between governmental 
departments. 
To date, climate-based taxes have been decided nationally. There remain 
many links to the other governance levels. In Finland, for example, changes in the 
rules for income tax deductions in respect of travel to work would also affect the 
municipalities. Different municipalities would be affected very differently because 
of different commuting distances, the availability of public transport and the share 
of the workforce working in other municipalities. On account of the economic 
relationships between countries, taxation in one country has implication across 
borders. The creation of a Nordic market for electricity thus motivated Finland 
in 1997 to move from the taxation of electricity production to consumption and 
to abolish the CO2 component of the electricity tax, while retaining it for heat. 
The Dutch fl ying tax did not reduce fl ying as much as expected, but shifted 
Dutch passengers to German and Belgium airports. Many have thus argued for 
taxes decided or at least co-ordinated at the EU level. There is, however, severe 
opposition in many countries to transferring resources and the power to decide on 
their use to the EU. Assigning new resources to the EU budget requires unanimity 
in the Council and ratifi cation by all member states. For example, many previous 
EU CO2 tax proposals have failed and been withdrawn. (Wilkinson et al. 2008) 
All governments in the countries studied have increased their budget 
allocations to climate-related activities. The increases have generally been related 
to either the creation of new institutions or to subsidies, mainly for renewable 
energies or energy effi ciency. For example, the Danish government’s budget 
for 2008 includes funding for the new Ministry of Climate and Energy, some € 
240 million (DKK 1.8 billion) in total in 2008. In addition, in 2008, about € 16 
million (DKK 116 million) were spent on preparing the 2009 COP-15 meeting. 
In Germany a total of about € 3.3 billion (including up to € 400 million from the 
auctioning of emissions allowances and around € 700 million from bilateral and 
multilateral development cooperation) are earmarked for climate policy for the 
2008 fi nancial year. This is an addition of € 1.8 billion compared to the federal 
budget for 2005. 
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So far, no systematic and institutionalised approach, such as Green 
Budgeting or Sustainability Impact Assessment of public spending, has been 
applied to state budgeting in any of the countries included in the study. In addition, 
the external monitoring – from a climate perspective – of the budgeting process or 
the use of fi nancial resources by external organisations, such as auditing offi ces, 
has been limited or non-existent.
The state budget – and the same is true for other governmental levels as 
well (EU, regional, municipal) – could be used to provide much bigger incentives 
for climate change mitigation and adaptation. However, this would require new 
types of knowledge to be integrated into the budget preparation process – 
especially knowledge on the direct as well as indirect mitigation impacts and the 
effects on adaptive capacity of budget allocations and taxes. Climate change 
has not traditionally been a key expertise of fi nance ministries, nor of most of 
those involved in budget preparation in other ministries or agencies. It would also 
require an increased knowledge of the parliaments to deal with this aspect of 
budgeting. The biggest challenge is to recognise the indirect climate impacts of 
budget allocations, which depend on complex interactions between many actors 
that are likely to be context-specifi c. Finally, utilising the budget as a climate policy 
instrument also requires climate aspects to be taken into account in the follow up 
and control of public spending by state controller offi ces and audit offi ces. 
4.4. Spatial planning as an increasingly important 
instrument for climate change mitigation and adaptation
Spatial planning is to a greater extent becoming an important instrument for 
implementing and integrating many climate policy aims. This is because many 
adaptation as well as mitigation measures have important spatial implications 
and often are in confl ict with other goals for land use. At the same time, there 
is a growing need to co-ordinate sectoral policies at different levels of decision-
making more effectively. Spatial planning is a promising instrument for addressing 
these challenges and to provide integrated responses at the local level. Particular 
land use practices such as (de)forestation contribute to global warming, while 
the impacts of climate change will signifi cantly alter land use practices, whose 
regulation is a major concern of spatial planning. 
The consequences of climate change will be experienced on a local level 
and will differ markedly from region to region. While coastal areas, for instance, 
will be prone to rising sea levels and possibly to more intense and severe storm 
fl oods, continental areas may be prone to more intense and enduring droughts 
leading to water shortage and crop failures. Hence, adaptation strategies need 
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to be suited to the respective regional or local conditions. At the same time, the 
potential for implementing mitigation measures is also highly diverse across 
regions: rural areas might be particularly suitable for setting up wind-parks or 
solar fi elds, while urban areas might possibly need more green corridors or space 
for water storage. At this level, confl icts between different land use options, for 
example biofuel production versus restoring ecosystems or food production, 
need to be addressed since actors might be immediately affected by proposed 
measures, such as resettlements as a result of fl ood management. To respond to 
such confl icts strategies should be built upon integrative approaches, including 
different sectors, scales and levels, involving a wide range of instruments (including 
regulatory plans, fi scal incentives or sanctions, voluntary and soft measures) and 
considering future development. 
Across Europe, a variety of different frameworks and strategies are used 
for climate change adaptation. In the Netherlands, for instance, the challenge of 
adapting to the consequences of climate change has been implemented in the 
national water management strategy – the heightening of dykes, giving room to 
rivers – and plays a decisive role in that country. In Germany, on the other hand, 
adaptation to climate change has not been a major issue in fl ood management 
until now because its linkage to climate change is still being contested. At the 
same time, impacts of climate change are increasingly recognized as a pre-
existing problem that has to be integrated into research and planning strategies. 
In all countries, the process is on the level of policy 
formulation and not yet on the level of the 
formulation of concrete instruments and 
measures. 
There is also potential for in-
tegrating mitigation in spatial plan-
ning, especially when it comes 
to infrastructure and water and 
energy provision and the mod-
ernization of public buildings, 
but also in terms of land use 
cover and multi-functionality in 
agriculture. However, for various 
reasons, implementation is rather 
diffi cult. Experiences from Finland 
show that despite the fact that the 
government and municipalities had ac-
knowledged the need to link transport and 
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land use planning for the purposes of climate change mitigation as long ago as 
the 1990s, the community structure has continued to disperse. In Spain, where 
there have been similar experiences, policy-makers see the development of the 
urban sector and construction during the last 10 years as a key driver for climatic 
changes in the area. This has been corroborated by scientifi c results on the 
diminution of local evaporation due to land use changes from agricultural use to 
urban use (Millan 2007). Still, this development is justifi ed by Spanish politicians 
on the basis of regional economic growth. 
Spatial planning actually faces a particular dilemma: while the need 
for co-ordination and integration across sectors, scales and levels is growing, 
the capacities to respond are frequently shrinking because of the rigidity of 
administrative and political borders, the stability of departmentalism and the 
strength of sectoral interests and preferences for small-scale solutions. While 
it is generally recognised that the role of spatial planning for climate mitigation 
and adaptation should be strengthened, the practice is not very well developed 
as yet.
4.5. Cross-compliance as a climate policy instrument 
Cross-compliance has been introduced in the context of the EU’s common 
agricultural policy (CAP) as a mechanism to promote coherence (e.g. Varela-
Ortega and Calatrava 2004). Cross-compliance implies that target groups 
receiving support are obliged to respect, e.g. environmental regulations. In other 
words, one policy, i.e. CAP, is used to ensure compliance with another policy, i.e. 
environmental policy. Conceptually, cross-compliance could be taken to mean 
ensuring compliance of one policy through another policy. Cross-compliance could 
thus be used for ensuring compliance of climate change mitigation or adaptation 
through any other policy. It may, for example, be as important in the case of EU’s 
structural policies as for the CAP. In practice, it has in the studied countries so far 
mainly been discussed for agriculture.
Cross-compliance is a relatively new policy that was only recently introduced 
on a compulsory basis (as from the 1st of January 2005). The empirical base for 
understanding cross-compliance is therefore quite limited at present. In most 
countries the purposes for cross-compliance have been identifi ed but these 
do not always include a focus on climate change adaptation or mitigation. In 
2007, Denmark had 113 cross-compliance requirements. None of the Danish 
requirements has an explicit focus on climate change mitigation or adaptation. 
In the Netherlands and Germany, no use of cross-compliance for climate policy 
aims was found. The new (2008) Climate and Energy Strategy of Finland takes 
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a stand on cross-compliance by declaring that “the reduction of greenhouse 
gases and the targets of energy conservation will be taken into account in all 
planning of the subsidy policy of agriculture” and that “Finland will strive to 
infl uence the EU for changing the guidelines of state subsidies so that the use 
of national measures to limit the greenhouse gases will be possible.” In Spain, 
cross-compliance requirements are most closely related to climate change aims 
as these include requirements linked to irrigation and water extraction. In the 
United Kingdom, cross-compliance requirements are also integrated into grant 
and subsidy schemes – e.g. the Environmental Stewardship (ES) scheme under 
the Rural Development Programme England (RDPE) – that do address climate 
change concerns.
In addition to the direct use of cross-compliance for climate policy 
integration, existing cross-compliance requirements also have a range of ancillary 
climate-change implications. These include, for example, improved soil structure 
and reduced soil carbon loss, and transformations in the agricultural sector 
such as a shift towards lower-input agriculture reducing nitrous oxide emissions, 
and reductions in livestock numbers limiting methane emissions. The 2006 
UK Climate Change Programme document, for instance, estimates that cross-
compliance will effect 0.68 MtC emission savings through reductions of livestock 
methane in 2010.
Technically, cross-compliance could improve climate policy integration by 
ensuring compliance with climate goals. However, cross-compliance is a rather 
top-down way of controlling human behaviour. There is a clear risk that such a 
centralized and hierarchal style of regulation may result in antagonistic responses 
and reduced legitimacy. 
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5. The present and potential 
role of climate policy 
integration and improved 
coherence
5.1. Recognising the window 
of opportunity for climate policies 
Climate change is currently one of the most important political issues in Europe. 
It is repeatedly one of the top priority issues when heads of state meet in the 
European Council. It has a more prominent role in the governmental programmes 
than ever before. And many cities, such as Copenhagen, Rotterdam and Helsinki, 
have made climate commitments (Section 3.1). A pessimist would still say that this 
is nothing new. Climate change was already one of the top issues of international 
politics during the preparation for the United Nations’ Conference on Environment 
and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, where the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change was also signed. Many European countries, e.g. 
the Netherlands and Germany, prepared their fi rst climate strategies already 
in the early 1990s. Also new – and at that time even radical – specifi c policy 
instruments were introduced, such as the fi rst CO2 tax by Finland already in 1990. 
Despite all the efforts during the last two decades, the climate problem has 
not been resolved, and we are even further away from a low-carbon society. An 
optimist can clearly see differences in current climate politics, however, which 
may make it possible to move from merely talking and planning to acting, i.e. 
mitigating climate change and adopting to the changing climate. 
Some of the triggers that put climate change at the top of the political 
agenda are common across Europe. These include the publishing of the Stern 
Review on the Economics of Climate Change in 2006 and the fourth assessment 
report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2007. The 
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Nobel Peace Prize for 2007 awarded to the IPCC and Al Gore was an important 
milestone as well. Other reasons are related to extreme whether conditions 
experienced in recent years and their environmental impacts. These experiences 
have been local, but have often worked as important triggers for national climate 
policies. The 2002 fl ooding of the rivers Elbe and Mulde in Germany, the 2003 
heatwave in France, Germany and Spain, the 2005 storm in Denmark, the 2007 
fl oods in the United Kingdom and the exceptionally mild winter in Finland in 2008 
have all put the spotlight on climate change nationally. In addition, the aim of the 
German chancellor Angela Merkel to make ”ambitious climate protection goals” 
one of the two forward-looking decisions during the German Presidency of the 
European Union in 2007 have also affected the position of climate change in the 
domestic political arena. Similarly, the Danish focus on climate change problems 
has been increased by the fact that Copenhagen is hosting the 15th Conference 
of Parties to the United Nations’ Climate Change Framework Convention (COP–
15) at the end of 2009.
While all of the countries studied now have more ambitious climate goals 
than earlier, there are differences. Some countries design their policies and 
strategies largely in order to fulfi l their national obligations according to the Kyoto 
Protocol or requirements agreed upon within the European Union. Finland and 
Spain, for example, belong to this group. Other countries set more ambitious 
national goals than those adopted by the EU and proactively aim to reach 
stronger international and EU agreements. These countries also aim to become 
international forerunners and thus to gain fi rst-mover advantages. Germany, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom belong to this group. While the difference 
between the groups is apparent, its meaning should not be oversimplifi ed. First, 
the Kyoto or EU requirements are harder for some countries to reach than for 
others, depending on, for example, the structure of the economies and energy 
production and changes in these due to external factors. Second, the difference 
may also be related to different national policy styles of both target setting and 
international negotiations in general and not just in climate policies.
Recognising that the present climate policy declarations are not unique, 
why then is the situation now different? What are the factors that frame the 
”window of opportunity” that actually may make real solutions possible this time? 
First, the political support is broader than before. Climate change is no longer 
delegated to just one minister, one ministry or a few institutions. It is a matter 
for prime ministers, whole cabinets and the entire administrations. Second, the 
recent climate strategies recognise the need for – and are built on – climate policy 
integration to a much greater extent than was previously the case. (Section 3.1). 
The scope for action is thus much broader. Third, climate change is not viewed as 
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purely a problem with costs and lost jobs attached to it. More frequently climate 
change is reframed as an opportunity for innovations, for new enterprises and for 
profi ts. Fourth, the local experiences of extreme weather conditions combined 
with concrete local mitigation efforts have made the multi-level governance 
nature of any sustainable solutions obvious. While these factors determine an 
opportunity, it will be absolutely crucial how climate concerns can be coupled 
with other concerns, such as increased energy security and with the responses 
to the economic recession that started from the fi nancial crises in the autumn of 
2008. 
The time for actually starting to deal with the climate change problem may be here. 
It will not be easy, however, and the attempts may fail. Climate policy integration 
can have a crucial role if Europe truly wishes to mitigate climate change and to 
adapt to its impacts. This will, however, require: 
that climate policy integration is effi cient at multiple levels (discussed in • 
Section 5.2); 
that the opportunities, but also the limitations, of the innovation possibilities • 
are fully identifi ed and utilised (discussed in Section 5.3); 
that the old discussions and confl icts that climate policy integration reopens • 
can be handled (discussed in Section 5.4); 
that proper institutions and suffi cient resources are assigned (discussed in • 
Section 5.5); and
that climate policy integration becomes refl exive and that the monitoring, • 
assessment and retrospective evaluations that such a learning process 
requires are undertaken (discussed in Section 5.6). 
These requirements for making climate policy integration an effi cient part of the 
solution to the climate challenge are the themes of the sub-sections that follow. 
After these sections the limitations for climate policy integration will briefl y be 
discussed in Section 5.7. 
5.2. Effi cient policy integration requires action at many levels
As has been seen, climate policy is nowadays very widely included in governmental 
programmes and country strategies. But still the greenhouse gas emissions 
of many sectors and countries are increasing. In the cases where European 
countries have managed to reduce their emissions it has either been due to 
general factors not caused by climate policy or it has been because they have 
not only issued general strategies but also implemented specifi c measures 
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that have supported their strategic goals. 
General structural changes, such as the 
move from coal to gas in the United 
Kingdom and deindustrialization 
of Eastern Germany following the 
unifi cation process, have helped 
some countries to reduce their 
emissions. There are, however, a 
range of measures that establish 
that emissions can be reduced 
if specifi c and well implemented 
action is taken (Section 3.1). Making 
climate policy integration more effi -
cient does not therefore primarily re-
quire more inclusion in governmental pro-
grammes and climate strategies. It above all 
requires that consistency is more directly and openly 
addressed, that climate change is given enough political weight, that reporting 
is undertaken and that resources for integration – both in the form of know-how 
and money – are available. In other words, climate policy integration at the level 
of strategies would need to become deeper based on the other criteria for policy 
integration than inclusion (Sections 3.2 to 3.5). 
Yet, even more important than incorporating climate policy integration 
more deeply into policy strategies is extending it more fully to specifi c policy 
instruments (Figure 1). This means new policy instruments as well as changing the 
way in which the present instruments are shaped and implemented. As discussed 
in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 the need to deepen climate policy integration into spatial 
planning and governmental budgeting is common across the countries. It is 
important, however, that it does not just become a question of changing planning 
and budgeting processes – these processes are just means – but that the climate 
aspect really changes actual land use plans and the funds allocated. Furthermore, 
these changes need to be such that mitigation and adaptation, by companies and 
individuals, are actually enhanced. 
There is considerable potential to make budgeting a climate policy 
instrument. As already stated by Wildavsky (1986), budgeting refl ects power and 
through budgeting consensus may be generated, but confl icts are also made. Our 
assessment of the current state of climate policy integration in annual budgeting 
is largely in line with more general assessments of green budgeting (e.g. Wilkinson 
et al. 2008); signifi cant opportunities exist since integration is not generally taking 
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place in practice currently. If budgeting is going to integrate climate change aims, 
it has to be integrated not just into the preparation of the budget, but into all 
stages of the “budgeting life cycle”, i.e. planning expenditure priorities; formal 
adoption of the budget; implementation of the budget; monitoring, evaluation and 
reporting; and revenue raising (Wilkinson et al. 2008). The general mechanisms 
for all stages are in place, and in some cases have even been made stronger 
recently. What is lacking is suffi cient climate-specifi c knowledge as well as the 
political will to integrate climate aims in budgeting life cycle.
In addition to extending climate policy integration from the level of strategies 
to those of instruments, implementation and practice, it also needs to be more 
fully incorporated into a multi-level governance framework. Too frequently, 
both mitigation and adaptation are seen as concerning just one policy level or, 
if several levels are concerned, they are viewed as simply a top-down control 
problem. The following statement by Tol (2005, 573) is quite typical for the single 
level perspective: ”Mitigation is primarily a matter of national governments in the 
context of international negotiations. Adaptation is primarily a matter of local 
managers of natural resources, and individual households and companies, in 
the context of a regional economy and society.” This study has clearly shown that 
both mitigation and adaptation concerns all levels from the local to the global and 
that the interactions between levels are complex and multidirectional. 
Firstly, the carbon neutrality aim declared by municipalities such as Skive, 
Frederikshavn and Samsø in Denmark and Kuhmoinen, Mynämäki, Padasjoki, 
Parikkala and Uusikaupunki in Finland5 is far in advance of national ambitions. 
More importantly than just examining intentions, it is clear that in many mitigation-
related decisions the conditions are generally set locally or the decisions are even 
made by municipalities. Local authorities usually develop land use plans that 
greatly infl uence the need for mobility and possible modes of mobility, including 
the extent and form of public transport. Municipalities also greatly infl uence the 
possibilities of different forms of energy production and, through procurement, 
energy use. The list could be made much longer. It is beyond doubt that mitigation 
is also an issue for local politicians and administrations, as well as for those 
making decisions at the national, EU or UN level. 
Although specifi c adaptation measures are applied locally, this does not 
mean that other levels are irrelevant. The incentives for adaptation measures 
are largely affected by resources and regulations, e.g. insurance laws and 
rules, decided at the national or EU level. If adaptation to climate change is to 
5 Website (the fi ve Finnish municipalities): www.environment.fi /canemu 
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be integrated into policies that affect agriculture or water, the EU level has to 
be included because the Common Agricultural Policy and the Water Framework 
Directive set vital frameworks in these fi elds. Like mitigation, adaptation is also 
a multi-level issue, and effi cient policy integration of both aspects requires that 
this be recognised.
The need to recognise the multi-level perspective more fully is further 
emphasised by two of the trends that make contemporary climate policy different 
from earlier policies: the integration of climate policy is aimed at more sectors; and 
there is an increased reliance on innovation opportunities. Firstly, when climate 
policy is integrated into several policy sectors, the responsibilities of different 
levels varies between sectors. In agricultural policy, the role of the EU is strong, 
whereas the role of local authorities is often very strong in land use planning 
and the national level dominates educational and research policies in most 
countries. In all these cases all other levels matter, but their roles and the type of 
interaction between the levels are sector-specifi c. When climate change is seen 
as an innovation opportunity, the interactions between national research and 
development, local business incentives, EU product policies and the innovation 
incentives provided by different types of regulations become central. In other 
words, all levels are important, but not in a top-down implementation way, and 
the importance of interactions with private actors at all levels are obvious. 
Understanding climate change as a complex problem also requires a better 
understanding of governance that fully accounts for the variety of institutions at 
various levels. New governance mechanisms that would fulfi l these challenges 
have not yet crystallised into simple language, or a consistent discourse, and 
still entail a surplus of terms such as social learning, networks, multi-stakeholder 
processes and refl exive governance. It is important to realise that these multi-
player and multi-level governance processes always also contain elements of 
hierarchy and markets, which have to be taken into account when assessing the 
effectiveness of such mechanisms. Furthermore, multi-player and multi-level 
governance does not imply that everything is open for constant renegotiation and 
that nothing can be fi xed. In the case of climate change, it has clearly been shown 
that citizens and business companies will not make adequate decisions without 
consistent and fi rm signals, incentives and regulations. 
5.3. Climate change is becoming viewed 
as an innovation and business opportunity 
It is well known that the way in which an issue is framed affects the solutions 
proposed. It is therefore important to recognise that climate change has recently 
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been reframed in many countries. Whereas climate change used to be seen as a 
”limited” environmental or energy issue, it is now more frequently being viewed 
largely as an encompassing issue which provides opportunities for innovations, 
new businesses and profi ts. 
During the 1990s, the way in which climate change was discussed and 
institutionalised differed from country to country. In most European countries, 
the political debates on climate change started in the late 1980s or early 1990s. 
During that time, climate change was discussed as one 
aspect of sustainable development, a concept 
that had been pushed to the fore following 
the publication of the ”Brundtland report” 
in 1987. For example, the Dutch National 
Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP1) enti-
tled, ”To Choose or To Lose” (Kiezen of 
Verliezen), presented in 1989, explic-
itly considers climate change, but it 
is mainly presented as an emission 
problem. At the 1990 Finnish National 
Environmental Meeting, ”The Time has 
Come” (Aika on kypsä), the climate problem 
was clearly recognised by the prime minister; 
at the same time, the national diffi culties 
related to reducing CO2 emissions were also stated 
(Holkeri 1990). In Germany, climate change was originally 
perceived negatively and framed as a ”catastrophe” requiring immediate action. 
In terms of both energy and the environment, climate change was perceived as a 
threat to the national competitiveness and a ”job killer”. 
In countries in which climate change was framed simply as an additional 
environmental issue it has been argued, although not established indisputably, 
that climate issues have been partly marginalised and have suffered from the 
often relatively weak position of environmental ministries. In cases in which 
climate policy has been seen as primarily a part of sustainable development 
policies the same has been observed and, in addition, it has been affected by the 
recent decrease in the emphasis on sustainable development. In Finland, where 
it was framed as an energy issue, the debate largely focused on different forms 
of energy production, such as nuclear power versus natural gas, and many other 
aspects, such as energy use, were not as central.
Recently climate change has been reframed as a ”business chance” 
and an ”innovation opportunity”. The idea being promoted is that so-called win-
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win opportunities may benefi t industry and the climate alike and result in both 
mitigation of (or adaptation to) climate change and increased competitiveness. 
Innovation opportunities are being highlighted in several countries, including 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (Section 
3.2). 
A parallel – and in some ways even more radical – reframing of the climate 
change issue that has taken place in Europe can be seen in the Obama and Biden 
(2008) energy plan presented during the U.S. presidential campaign, as well as in 
Obama’s earlier writings (2006) and recent speeches (New York Times, November 
19, 2008). One goal of the Obama and Biden (2008) plan is to ”help create fi ve 
million new jobs by strategically investing $ 150 billion over the next 10 years to 
catalyze private efforts to build a clean energy future”. Another one is to ”convert 
our [America’s] manufacturing centers into clean technology leaders”. The Obama 
and Biden plan includes a variety of additional instruments, such as emissions 
trading and energy effi ciency standards, as well as technological support. If such 
a new U.S. plan is actually implemented, it is likely to have signifi cant implications 
for other societies (including the EU countries studied in this report) as a result of 
the globalisation of economies and in particular technology and information.
The complete integration of climate aims into technology and innovation 
policies may be challenging, as demonstrated by earlier research into 
environmental policy integration into technology policy in Finland (Kivimaa and 
Mickwitz 2006). Even when environmental aims were largely included in policy 
strategies and mainstreaming was declared, it was not fully achieved in specifi c 
decisions. Instead, environmental aims were largely separated into specifi c 
research and development programmes and largely ignored in other programmes 
or funding decisions. The innovation turn of climate policy requires that climate 
policy integration be fully extended from general strategies to specifi c policy 
instruments (as discussed more generally in Section 5.2).
The innovation-oriented climate policy would also need to recognise 
fully the development of general innovation policy and theory from a ”linear 
innovation model” focused merely on R&D support to a systemic approach. The 
systemic approach stresses markets and commercialisation (Kivimaa 2008) 
as well as the need for a horizontal innovation policy which is embedded in a 
wider socio-economic context (Lundvall et al. 2002, Smits and Kuhlmann 2004). 
Climate policy integrated into such an innovation policy framework would include 
a proactive government, demanding targets and a mix of instruments which 
infl uence the entire innovation cycle from initial research to achieving success in 
global markets. 
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A key insight from innovation research 
is that innovations take time. In order 
for climate policy signals to be able 
to induce innovation, the signals 
provided by politicians in general 
and specifi c policy measures 
in particular have to be fore-
seeable, consistent and cred-
ible (e.g. Kivimaa 2008). For 
example, the policy signal that 
the International Maritime Or-
ganization (IMO) would intro-
duce binding regulations on 
NOx emissions was credible 
enough to cause companies to 
invest in R&D for achieving this goal 
many years before the regulation was 
formally adopted (Mickwitz et al. 2008b). 
In order to provide incentives for private fi rms to 
invest in research and development on climate-related objectives, there must 
be trust that a market for these products, processes or technologies will exist in 
the future. If the economic recession that started in the autumn 2008 causes 
governments to back off from declared climate policy aims and measures, this 
will undermine the credibility of such a message. 
The current emphasis on win-win solutions and innovations provides new 
opportunities, but it may also conceal some trade-offs and cause some new 
confl icts. This is because, even if confl icts and contradictions frequently give rise 
to innovations, not all confl icts can be resolved by technologies or innovations, and 
innovation processes may sometimes be very slow. It is frequently the case that 
the innovation-based climate policy approach is focused solely on technological 
innovations, largely ignoring process and social innovation. The technological focus 
and the overly narrow concept of innovation a priori excludes many alternatives 
linked to structural and behavioural changes, which could be more effi cient. The 
focus on marketable technological solutions marginalizes or even excludes the 
environmental impacts of climate change, such as the loss of species, where 
technical fi xes are not available from the adaptation debate. Although the current 
emphasis on economic opportunities contains some limitations and risks, the 
failure to explore these possibilities would be even more risky. When energy or 
emissions become more expensive, as a result of climate policies, countries and 
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fi rms that have not developed more energy effi cient products and processes and 
cleaner energy production technologies will not be competitive. Not all countries, 
regions or fi rms can, however, win in a competition of relative advantages. It is 
already evident that the fi rms and sectors most closely locked into technologies 
that require a lot of energy and produce CO2-intensive products, or which have not 
invested in this type of R&D, often oppose innovation-based climate policy. 
Economies in transition, such as the new EU member states, have a great 
opportunity to couple economic restructuring and climate aims. At the same 
time, there is an obvious risk that economic development will be seen as much 
more urgent, and that climate issues will simply be bypassed. Integrating climate 
change into EU structural funds is thus essential for the diffusion of innovations 
and the restructuring of these economies. The recent economic crisis will also 
reveal, for new as well as old EU member states, the real strength of the win-
win argument for innovation-oriented climate policies. Will the EU and national 
governments really expect climate policies to stimulate national economies or will 
they cut climate policy expenses? 
5.4. Climate policy integration reopens 
and reframes old discourses and confl icts
In December 2002 the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland rejected the 
application by Kemijoki Ltd to construct the ”Vuotos” reservoir and a dam in the 
upper course of the Kemijoki river. The decision was based on the Finnish Water 
Act, but also involved European Community law and International law (Koivurova 
2004). Many thought that this was the end of one of the longest and best-known 
environmental struggles in Finland. Climate change and the quest to increase 
the use of renewable and domestic energy have, however, reopened the debate 
on hydropower in general and Vuotos in particular. For example, during the 
parliamentary debate about the new Climate and Energy Strategy in November 
2008, Vuotos was mentioned several times and opinion was as divided as ever. 
This is an example of how climate policy integration can often reopen old confl icts, 
as in this case related to land use confl icts. Similar examples can be found in all 
of the countries studied.
Another case of climate change inclusion in a project is that of the bridge 
across the Fehmern Belt between Southern Denmark and Germany. According 
to its initiators, this project would reduce CO2 emissions because the fi xed link 
would reduce congestion and produce less CO2 than the current ferries. However, 
the plan did not take account of the increase in traffi c that usually follows the 
construction of new infrastructure. 
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In many ways the greatest confl ict that has been reframed through climate 
arguments is the debate on the construction of new nuclear reactors. In the past, 
risks of radioactivity leakages from power plants or waste storage sites were the 
focus of the discussion. Recently, the argument that nuclear energy is a possible 
solution to the problem of reducing CO2 emissions has become prominent 
in many European countries. This has been the case in Finland, Germany and 
the Netherlands. Nuclear power is still highly controversial, both politically and 
socially, and the outcomes have varied in these countries. 
Box 11. Integrating climate change into the nuclear 
debate: different histories and different results
After the Chernobyl accident in 1986, attitudes towards nuclear power became 
critical and risks – related to both production and waste – became the primary 
issue in the nuclear debate. This resulted in a cessation of Dutch “nuclear 
ambitions”, in the rejection of an application for a fi fth nuclear power plant by 
the Finnish Parliament in 1993, and in the “Atomkonsens” to end the use of 
nuclear power in Germany. At that time, climate change was not a major issue in 
the nuclear debate in any of these countries. During the last decade climate has 
become a key argument in the nuclear debate of all three countries, however; 
but it has entered different discourses, which to date are producing different 
results. 
German scientists used climate change as an argument with which to 
defend nuclear power, a source of energy that became very unpopular after 
the Chernobyl accident. Since that time climate change has been closely 
linked to energy policy, one of the most contested policy sectors in Germany – 
characterised by an irreconcilable debate about nuclear power on the one hand 
and the potential of renewable energy production and energy-saving on the 
other. The Red-Green government under Schroeder initiated the phasing-out of 
nuclear power in 2002. The Act in question contains a ban on the construction 
of new nuclear power plants and the restriction of the so-called residual 
operating life to 32 years following the commissioning of the plant. Recently, this 
“consensus” has been challenged increasingly by industry and several policy-
makers, often with reference to greenhouse gas emissions targets.
In the Netherlands, the debate about nuclear power has been re-opened and 
the main arguments have been climate change, security of energy supply and 
resource independence. The Netherlands has added its name to the growing 
list of European countries that might build nuclear power stations to help meet 
their greenhouse gas targets. The fourth Balkenende government has decided 
to postpone a sensitive decision on whether or not to build a new nuclear power 
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plant until after the next elections. This has not stopped public discussion and 
political debate about nuclear power production in Holland, however. 
The Finnish National Climate Strategy of 2001 presented only two future 
scenarios, wherein the principal energy sources were either natural gas or 
nuclear power. Teollisuuden Voima Oyj had applied in 2000 for permission to 
build a fi fth nuclear power plant. Climate change mitigation was one of the 
main arguments heard in Parliament when the application was discussed, 
along with energy security, the competitiveness of the Finnish industry and 
employment. When Parliament voted on the application, approval was linked to 
four statements related to energy saving and renewable energy production. The 
application was approved although all political parties, except the Green League, 
were divided on the issue. Analyses of the debate in Parliament have argued 
that the earlier discourse focused on risk and the role of economic growth 
was replaced by a technology-focused and “ecological modernisation”-based 
discourse, where those in favour of the nuclear option stressed its effi ciency in 
reducing CO2 emissions and those against it argued for renewable energies also 
based on costs technological potential (Berg 2004). The fi fth Finnish nuclear 
power plant is under construction and the latest climate strategy (2008) contains 
the possibility of additional nuclear power plants. 
The discussion on climate change adaptation is also linked to existing 
policies and old or ongoing discussions. Often, adaptation has been seen largely as 
a water issue. Framing adaptation as a water-management problem is necessarily 
selective. By highlighting climate change adaptation as a water management issue 
or even as a spatial planning issue, other aspects of climate change adaptation 
are excluded or receive much less attention. When discussing spatial adaptations 
to climate change, policy-makers often prefer quick and technical solutions, such 
as – in the Netherlands – building higher and stronger dykes and not building in 
low-lying polders. These solutions are only partial, however. Building higher and 
stronger dykes may solve the problem of higher water levels but it does not solve 
the problems of other sectors such as agriculture, nature or tourism (Hajer 2007). 
The integration of adaptation into these other policy areas has been limited so far.
What do the presented examples reveal? Some would claim that they 
show that climate mitigation has been included and integrated successfully into 
all kinds of policy decisions. Others, however, would claim that mitigation or CO2 
reduction has been hijacked and misused by economic interest groups and other 
policy sectors. These examples also demonstrate that if climate change is linked 
to highly contested sectors such as energy and transport, reframing in terms of 
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climate change implies a redistribution of benefi ts and costs as well as power. 
The expectations of this redistribution is one source of opposition – but many of 
the old discussions reopened by climate change involve signifi cant value-based 
or ideological confl icts. For example, the value of nature, e.g. the Vuotos mires in 
Finland, versus economic interests, e.g. hydropower production. Nevertheless, 
by integrating climate change considerations, these discourses may change. 
Climate change considerations may also alter the importance given to different 
positions or reframe even more thoroughly the whole discussion, as in the case of 
the Finnish nuclear power debate. 
5.5. Institutions, measures and resources 
for climate policy integration and coherence
Many approaches to policy integration use the establishment of new institutions 
or the formal institutionalisation of refocused institutional agreements as one of 
their main criteria for policy integration (e.g. OECD 2002, EEA 2005a,b). In this 
study institutionalisation was not used as a specifi c criterion for policy integration, 
but it was considered within the context of the resources criterion. Furthermore, 
Section 4 discussed several of the key measures available for increased climate 
policy integration and improved coherence, such as ex ante impact assessment 
and ex post evaluation; the annual budget; spatial planning; and cross-compliance. 
The aim of this section is not to repeat the previous discussion, but to discuss the 
importance of there being suffi cient resources and institutional arrangements 
that function according to their specifi c context. At the same time, challenges 
related to the formation of institutions for climate policy integration and resource 
mobilisation will also be discussed briefl y.
It is obvious that the practical challenges are so extensive that without a 
clear assignment of resources policy integration cannot be achieved. Recognising 
coherence problems and identifying which policies have signifi cant climate side-
effects requires time and knowledge. Developing proposals for strategies and 
specifi c measures that integrate climate change also demands even more time 
and skills. So does the practical implementation and monitoring of the measures 
and evaluating their impact. Resources in the form of money, i.e. time and 
knowledge, are thus necessary for climate policy integration, and these resources 
could be provided either through existing or new institutions. 
As has been discussed, many countries have established new institutions 
which are responsible not only for climate policy but also for enhancing climate 
policy integration. For example, Denmark has established a new ministry and Spain 
a new ministerial department. Many countries have also established new research 
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institutes and appointed temporary climate specialists or 
councils. While these new institutions may certainly 
have an essential role in enhancing climate 
policy integration and coherence, the nature 
of integration is such that it also requires 
resources and knowledge within exist-
ing organisations. On the other hand, 
in countries or cities with fewer new 
climate-specifi c institutions, the need 
for climate knowledge, earmarked re-
sources and leadership in existing or-
ganisations is even greater.
Based on practical experience 
and theoretical studies from other 
contexts, it is not possible to determine 
whether new climate-specifi c institutions 
or the expanded mandates of old organiza-
tions provide a more effi cient strategy to en-
hance policy integration. Many studies have estab-
lished strong path dependence (Pierson 2000) and political inertia (Rose & 
Karran 1987). In other words, it is not easy to change the resource distribution 
and focus of established institutions. This would be an argument for at least 
relying partly on new institutions. On the other hand, there is a risk that new 
specialized institutions are seen as remote or even antagonistic in relation to 
established governmental structures. The critique of an ”additive” environmental 
administration (Hertin and Berkhout 2003), especially in relation to providing 
incentives for eco-innovations, could well be valid for ”additive” climate institutions 
as well. The critique is based on the view that segregated responsibilities 
maintain administrative misfi ts and antagonistic relationships focused on zero-
sum solutions, instead of producing the shared responsibility and co-operative 
relationships required for creating win-win solutions. This has resulted in particular 
in a lack of incentives for innovation, a bias against integrated technological 
responses and an unstable innovation context. More generally, it has also been 
concluded that ”governmental organizations appear more receptive to information 
produced internally than that which comes from external sources” (Rist 2000, 
200). In summary, extensive and effi cient climate policy integration is likely to 
benefi t from both specifi c institutions and being included in the mandate of more 
general established organisations.
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5.6. Policy integration based on learning 
– the need for assessment, evaluation and monitoring
The social and economic processes that affect greenhouse gas emissions or 
vulnerability to climate change are very complex. Although increased research 
may reduce some risks, climate policy will always have to be formulated in a 
context predominated by uncertainty and ignorance. Climate policy integration 
– at all levels, from the EU to the local – should therefore be refl exive and able 
to learn from past experiences. In other words, the processes through which 
climate concerns are integrated into sectoral policies should be based on careful 
pre-assessment but, in order to develop the policies adopted and implemented, 
policies should also be retrospectively evaluated from a climate perspective much 
more than hitherto.
All European countries use ex ante impact assessments of projects 
– Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) – strategies and plans (SEA) and, 
more recently, regulations (RIA). These impact assessments are all general 
environmental assessment processes. Their climate policy implications depend 
on the ability to recognise direct and indirect climate impacts in these processes, 
on the capacity to assess these climate impacts for various options and on the way 
in which the impact assessments are used (Section 4.3). Until recently, climate 
change has not played a major role in EIAs, SEAs or RIAs. However, some work 
has been undertaken recently in order to make EIA (both for projects and plans) 
climate-proof, with regard to climate change adaptation as well as climate change 
mitigation. In practice, there are huge differences in the quality of the SEAs and 
RIAs undertaken. Time pressure and the availability of background information 
are sometimes obstacles for performing good SEAs and RIAs and there are large 
variations in how well climate change impacts are integrated into individual 
assessments. The use of SEAs and RIAs will, in addition to the context specifi c 
political situation, depend on the institutional capabilities of ministries, agencies 
and parliaments to take advantage of these assessments and in particular the 
aspects of them related to climate change. 
Since pre-assessment is about providing information for decision making 
in very complex contexts, the focus cannot be on relying solely on scientifi c 
knowledge. Instead, scientifi c fi ndings must be translated and reconsidered in 
order to meet the needs of decision makers. In general, complex problem solving 
requires the recognition of mutual dependence between the actors involved. In 
such situations, negotiating both problem defi nitions and solutions is required, and 
EIA, SEA and RIA may be as much about providing a process that provides space 
for multiple perspectives as about generating just ”facts” or paper products.
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With the exception of a few countries, retrospective policy and programme 
evaluation is a somewhat recent phenomenon in Europe (Furubo et al. 2002). 
In addition, evaluation has come later to the environmental fi eld than to many 
other policy areas (Mickwitz 2003). It is therefore no surprise that most climate 
strategies and policy instruments lack specifi cations as to how they will be 
monitored and evaluated. Several programmes, plans, policies etc. are not very 
explicit as to how the mechanisms for climate change aims are supposed to work. 
In addition, goals are often very general, like national reduction targets. If the 
goal is not subdivided into more specifi c goals – e.g. for different sectors – it 
becomes more diffi cult to plan a reporting procedure, and later, ex post, to assess 
successes and failures. It is essential, however, not to evaluate goal achievement 
per se, but to evaluate the means – strategies, instruments, changed practices 
etc. – by which to reach them.
The evaluation of the climate aspects of policies is not an easy task, since 
actors are affected simultaneously by multiple policy interventions. In addition, 
when one actor’s actions are determined through complex interactions with 
several others, and because the time span between decisions and effects may 
be very lengthy, evaluation becomes even more challenging. Hardly ever is it 
possible to attribute change – or a quantitative part of it – unambiguously to a 
specifi c policy intervention. At the same time, there is no alternative; only through 
a versatile debate on ”what works” based on counter-factual thinking can climate 
policy integration be improved on the basis of experience. In an international 
context, it is essential that countries can learn from each others’ experiences of 
policy integration as well.
Effective climate policy integration will need to be refl exive, adjusting to 
new circumstances and actively seeking new information about what is working 
and what is not. Such a refl exive policy, which contributes to policy learning 
over time, is only possible if the evaluation community becomes stronger. This 
requires improved interaction between social and natural scientists; it also 
requires an increased engagement by those undertaking assessment, evaluation 
and monitoring, those whose efforts are being evaluated and those using the 
knowledge produced. This community would need to discuss not only the fi ndings 
of the assessments, evaluations and monitoring undertaken, but also their 
different views on knowledge, knowledge production and use. 
5.7. Climate policy integration is no panacea 
This study has focused on climate policy integration and coherence, rather than 
on climate policy as a whole. While integrating climate policy aims into other 
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policies is essential for effective climate policies, it is far from all that is required. 
The mitigation policy debate, especially at the 
international level, has largely been about 
issues such as setting overall emission 
reduction targets and time sched-
ules, dividing these between coun-
tries and establishing emission 
trading systems and other 
market-based instruments. All 
these issues are and will like-
ly remain important aspects 
of climate policy, and they 
demonstrate that climate pol-
icy neither can nor should be 
just about climate policy inte-
gration and increased coherence. 
At the same time, the limited, or 
even absent, achievements of cli-
mate mitigation policies so far speak 
in favour of complementing the traditional 
approaches with one whereby climate aims are 
taken into account in sectoral policies in order to address the forces that have 
continued to increase greenhouse gas emissions – from traffi c, for example. 
If the fi rst caveat is that climate policy integration alone may not fi x the whole 
climate change problem, the second is that it might not work at all. There used 
to be high hopes of environmental policy integration (EPI) as the way of actually 
achieving sustainable development (e.g. Lafferty and Hovden 2003). The more 
recent assessments of environmental policy integration, however, are generally 
quite pessimistic. Jordan and Schout (2006, 259) conclude that it is no surprise 
that the EU has problems with EPI: ”In effect, it [the EU] has set itself a political 
target, then failed to put in place suffi cient implementing (or, to be more precise, 
coordinating) mechanisms to deliver it.” While Jacobs, Volkery and Lenschow 
(2008, 26) state: ”The implementation of the EU’s strategy for sustainable 
development subsequently lost momentum, a development which was mirrored 
across many other EU Member States.” This study verifi es this development in 
many countries, such as Finland and Germany, and also in many municipalities. 
The experiences with EPI raise two questions for climate policy integration. First, 
what can be learned from the disappointing experiences of EPI that could be 
taken into account when enhancing climate policy integration? Second, what is 
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the relationship between EPI and climate policy integration? Could an increased 
focus on climate policy integration assist in building a new momentum for EPI or 
will it be its fi nal death blow? 
The declining focus on EPI in the EU as well as in many individual countries 
has been linked to the a lack of political support (Jordan and Lenschow 2008). The 
shortage of political support has been related both to the focus shifting to other 
issues, e.g. from the political commitment to the Cardiff process to the Lisbon 
process and to the change in the party composition of governments. Jordan and 
Lenshow (2008, 329) also state that EPI and sustainable development ”has not 
attracted much sustained public attention and support”. The contrast with climate 
change is obvious. The nature of both the concept of sustainable development 
and EPI are that they are abstract and quite vague, making it hard for politicians, 
interest groups or the media to build appealing stories around them. In addition to 
a lack of political support, EPI has also suffered from a lack of resources; a lack 
of effi cient institutions and specifi c means; and a lack of evaluation and feedback 
mechanisms. In other words, all the aspects that we have argued as being crucial 
for effi cient climate policy integration have been missing.
The attention to climate change, by politicians, the media as well as 
the general public, has provided possibilities for climate policy integration; but 
it has also shifted the focus away from sustainable development and EPI. If 
climate policy integration becomes successful, both administratively through 
institutionalisation, and in society through observable outcomes, i.e. mitigated 
emissions and enhanced adaptive capacity to climate change, this could have 
positive impacts for sustainable development and EPI more generally. First, 
action taken to decouple greenhouse gas emissions from production may be 
benefi cial also for other environmental aspects, e.g. through reduced use of 
natural resources. Second, and more importantly, if organisations and means 
emerge that can effi ciently integrate climate change and, in addition, if climate 
policy becomes refl exive, there would be a basis on which to expand so as to 
encompass sustainable development as a whole. However, there is also a risk 
that integration based on a single specifi c environmental problem would shift 
the attention even further away from moral and comprehensive issues like 
sustainable development. 
81Climate Policy Integration, Coherence and Governance
82 Climate Policy Integration, Coherence and Governance
83Climate Policy Integration, Coherence and Governance
6. Conclusions
It is becoming evident to politicians as well as the general public that if high-
consumption societies are going to tackle climate change, signifi cant changes in 
production as well as consumption processes will be required. These changes will 
concern fundamental features of life, such as food, energy, mobility and land use. 
The relevance of climate policy integration is thus straightforward; the necessary 
change cannot be achieved unless climate change is taken into account in 
the general and sector-specifi c policies essential for economic activities and 
general social organisation. Whilst the need for climate policy integration is 
easy to recognize, attaining it in practice is challenging. In addition, promoting 
policy integration instead of issue specifi c policies is also an old way resisting 
change, by diffusing attention and by making the means and resources for policy 
implementation weak, while declaring support for change through proclaimed 
integration. There is a huge need to evaluate stated climate policy integration 
claims and to extend such evaluation from general strategies to specifi c actions. 
Climate change is one of the most important issues in contemporary 
politics. Different states have made international commitments to handling global 
warming since Rio in 1992. What is different now is that the inclusion of climate 
change mitigation and adaptation in general governmental programmes and 
strategies has substantially increased. In addition, both mitigation and adaptation 
increasingly focus on inclusion and integration in sectoral policies. In order to 
make climate policy integration matter, it is necessary for consistency between 
climate and other aims to be more directly and openly addressed. Managing 
consistency may reveal new win-win possibilities; in other case, however, trade-
offs will remain and choices will have to be made. In these cases it is essential 
that climate change be given enough political weight. 
While climate change is now widely recognised in programmes and 
strategies, much more will be needed in the form of specifi c measures. This 
may require the creation of new mechanisms, such as the 2008 Climate Change 
Act in the United Kingdom. It also means, however, that existing measures and 
institutions are to be used as climate policy instruments to a greater extent than 
hitherto. The annual budgets, impact assessments and spatial planning are three 
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examples of existing measures with signifi cant 
potential to be climate policy instruments.
Contrary to what is frequently 
claimed, climate change mitigation is 
not an issue solely for internation-
al and national policies. Regional 
and local decision-makers ma-
ke a huge number of decisions 
that directly or indirectly affect 
traffi c, energy production or en-
ergy use more generally. These 
and other decisions on land use 
change – deforestation, peat land 
cultivation etc. – are crucial as re-
gards greenhouse gas emissions. On 
the other hand, it is also clear that ad-
aptation to climate change is not just a local 
issue. Water management and agriculture are 
just two examples of policy fi elds, essential for adaptation, 
in which the general policy framework is largely decided by the European Union. In 
order to be effi cient, the integration of both mitigation and adaptation aims would 
need to recognize the interconnections between multiple levels, from the local to 
the international.
For a long time, climate change has largely been perceived just in terms 
of restrictions and limitations on economic activity, resulting in expense, 
bankruptcies and job losses. Recently, many European countries – as well as 
Barack Obama – have started to redefi ne climate change in terms of innovation 
possibilities, business opportunities and potential profi ts. This new innovation-
based climate policy has great potential. It is clear that the required changes will 
call for new technologies, new processes and new social organisations. Those 
who can provide these will surely benefi t. Enhancing innovations through policies 
requires policy signals to be clear and credible over the long term. The strong 
innovation focus of climate policy has, however, tended to focus almost only on 
technological innovations – and mainly on separate ”climate” technologies rather 
than on the climate aspects of ordinary technologies. The potential process and 
social innovations may then be unrecognised. Furthermore, while tensions and 
confl icts often result in innovation, not all confl icts between climate policy aims 
and other policy goals can be solved by innovation, at least not in the short run.
85Climate Policy Integration, Coherence and Governance
When climate policy is integrated into more and more policy sectors, 
many old discourses and confl icts are reopened and reframed. The extended 
use of hydropower, new bridges, new roads and new waterways have all been 
promoted by arguments related to climate change. One of the largest confl icts 
that has been reframed through climate change is that concerning nuclear power. 
Several countries have started to consider new nuclear power plants as an option 
for producing electricity without greenhouse gas emissions. When the Finnish 
parliament approved the application of a fi fth nuclear power plant in 2001 the 
impacts on CO2 emissions had become a more important issue than the issues 
related to the risks that had dominated the previous debate. Many of the old 
disputes reopened by climate change involve large value-based or ideological 
confl icts, in which climate change is just an additional feature. In such cases, the 
possibility of successfully integrating climate change will depend on the ability to 
handle the general ideological and value confl icts. 
Effective climate policy integration will require suffi cient resources in the 
form of knowledge and money. Without these resources, there will be no realistic 
possibility of truly recognising the links between general or sectoral policies and 
climate change or of fi nding alternatives and implement them. Given the great 
complexity of the socio-economic processes that result in greenhouse gas 
emissions, as well as those of adapting to a changing climate, policies need to be 
based on learning. In order to provide the basis for such a refl exive climate policy 
integration, interventions should be monitored, proposed interventions should 
be assessed and retrospective evaluations of decisions made and implemented 
should be conducted. In view of the meagre culture of environmental policy and 
programme evaluation in Europe, providing the input for such a learning process 
is a huge challenge.
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